

AFRICAN UNION

الاتحاد الإفريقي



UNION AFRICAINE

UNIÃO AFRICANA

CAERT, B.P 141 Bureau Poste El-Mohammadia Alger, Algérie, Tel +213 21 520 1 10 Fax +213 21 5203 78  
Email : [admin@caert.org.dz](mailto:admin@caert.org.dz)

**ACSRT / CAERT**

African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism

# Terrorism

## Bi-weekly Press Review

### 1 - 15 July 2016

Review no. 117



## Press Review 1—15 July 2016

### Table of Contents

	Pages
<b>Terrorism in Africa</b>	
- Terrorisme : Qui veut la guerre ? Qui veut la paix ?	4
- Thomson Reuters' Terrorism Database Cites Wikipedia as a Source	13
<b>Kenya</b>	
- Kenya's Coast: Devolution Disappointed	15
- How Anti-Terrorism Tactics Are Being Used to Fight Elephant Poaching	17
<b>Nigeria</b>	
- The next Boko Haram? Nigerian attacks raise fears of new 'terror' threat	20
- Tortures, exécutions, détentions : le rapport qui accable l'armée camerounaise dans sa lutte contre Boko Haram	21
- Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism In Nigeria – Analysis	24
<b>Somalia</b>	
- AMISOM's withdrawal preparations reduce supply-chain risks and facilitate UN authorisation for a peace-keeping mission in Somalia post-2017	27
- Securing Somalia, Whatever the Cost	29
<b>South Africa</b>	
- Is South Africa vulnerable to ISIS terrorism activities on its soil?	33
<b>Terrorism in the World</b>	
<b>China</b>	
- ISIS recruits from China don't fit a typical profile – and Beijing may be partially to blame	34
<b>France</b>	
- Attentat de Nice: premiers éléments d'analyse	37
- Attentat de Nice : qui est Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, le chauffeur du camion ?	38
- Ce que l'on sait sur l'attentat de Nice	41
<b>India</b>	
- Africa outreach	45
<b>Iraq</b>	
- Analysis: ISIS's Ramadan Campaign of Terror	47
- ISIS Is a Symptom, Not the Cause, of the Middle East's Disintegration	51
- Analyse de l'infographie diffusée par l'Etat islamique, à l'occasion des deux ans de la proclamation du « califat »	57
- Terrorist recruitment	61

**Syria**

- Analysis: Islamic State Territory in Iraq, Syria Shrinks Another 12% in 2016 64
- Inside ISIS: Quietly preparing for the loss of the 'caliphate' 67

**Pakistan**

- Terrorism is terrorism and justification on part of Pakistan is not going to change that 72

**Turkey**

- Turkey coup: Erdoğan mourns casualties – and vows retribution 74

**USA**

- Is the surge in terrorist attacks coincidence or coordinated campaign? 77
- Terrorists slip through profiling gaps 81

### Terrorisme : Qui veut la guerre ? Qui veut la paix ?



### Un Monde de fous... ?

« On est presque soulagés... » décrète, sur France Info, un de ses « grands spécialistes » médiatiques, suite à la revendication par Daech de l'horrible attentat de Nice !

Ainsi, ce n'est plus « un simple déséquilibré » surgi de nulle part, mais un « soldat de Daech », qui a fait ce coup sordide et monstrueux. Nos journalistes se retrouvent ainsi rassérénés, en terrain connu, pour faire la propagande guerrière pour laquelle ils sont rémunérés...

En effet, comment expliquer à tout un chacun que le monde est devenu une sorte de roulette permanente où à tout instant votre voisin de palier, le quidam que vous croisez au volant, peut, sans le moindre signe précurseur, se révéler être une bombe vivante, une arme fatale improvisée, avec un minimum de moyens, constamment disponibles autour de lui...

Le nombre de fous agressifs aurait-il crû brutalement, de façon quasi-exponentielle, en quelques mois, telle une maladie mentale contagieuse faisant brusquement épidémie ? Et de plus une maladie transformant les fous agressifs en meurtriers de masse ?

Alors ? Fous furieux ou soldats de Dieu ?

On doit considérer sérieusement le fait que la société capitaliste en crise, sans perspectives fiables et stables pour le commun des mortels, entraîne de nombreux et profonds déséquilibres psychologiques, du stress, de la dépression de type burn-out ou simplement due à l'isolement, et de la désocialisation, d'une manière générale, en dépit, ou à cause, du développement exponentiel de la communication médiatique.

Autrement dit, le « vivier » s'est agrandi et approfondi, dans lequel peuvent puiser les manipulateurs de tous bords, incluant les organisations terroristes comme les « services spéciaux » des états légalement constitués et reconnus.

La leçon de l'histoire, depuis déjà la fin des années 70 et la guerre anti-soviétique en Afghanistan, c'est que le lien entre états « légaux », les USA en l'occurrence, et organisations terroristes, est un moyen de mener une guerre par personnes interposées, et notamment en recrutant ce genre de « soldats »...

L'« autre leçon », c'est que ce genre de marionnette échappe facilement à son créateur, pour être récupérée, et surtout, réutilisée, par d'autres manipulateurs, organisations ou même états « concurrents »...

De sorte que si, à l'époque, la guerre a pu paraître « gagnée », et l'était, stratégiquement, du point de vue « occidental », contre l'URSS, le séisme du 11 Septembre a montré que ce germe de la décomposition structurelle et psychologique du « nouveau monde unipolaire » était déjà profondément enraciné, et il n'a fait que s'étendre souterrainement, depuis, encouragé par l'engrais putride et sanglant des multiples conflits locaux où ces méthodes ont été reproduites, et notamment en Irak.

Politiquement, et encore plus, idéologiquement, les bases du monde unipolaire qui semblait devoir marquer « la fin de l'histoire », au tournant des années 90, sont, en réalité, celles qui ont été jetées, dès 1947, par l'impérialisme US, notamment avec le Plan Marshall, à l'aube de la Guerre Froide.

Bien évidemment, le caractère « universel » de la « Pax Americana » était un mythe, dont les « valeurs culturelles » et le « style de vie », nécessairement édulcorés, même en Europe de l'Ouest, ne concernaient en faits qu'une minorité de pays réellement « occidentalisés » au sens américain-US du terme.

A l'issue de la 2ème guerre mondiale, la très grande majorité des peuples du monde aspiraient à se libérer du joug colonial des puissances européennes décadentes, et ce n'était pas pour retomber sous celui de l'impérialisme US.

Avec la victoire de l'URSS sur le nazisme, qui avait pris corps bien avant celle des USA sur le Japon, cet élan de libération trouvait un appui solide, même s'il fut dévoyé, ultérieurement, par le social-chauvinisme de Khrouchtchev, notamment en Hongrie et en Tchécoslovaquie.

Mais, mythe contre mythe, l'« unité du camp socialiste » recouvrait, autour de l'URSS, une coalition hétéroclite de bourgeoisies nationalistes et bureaucratiques et de peuples aspirants au socialisme. Le cas de la Chine étant emblématique à cet égard, avec la politique de « Démocratie Nouvelle » de Mao Zedong, qui prétendait précisément associer ces catégories en jouant sans cesse sur l'ambiguïté « de la contradiction », suivant sa philosophie de bazar éponyme, avant de retourner définitivement sa veste de bleu de chauffe au service de l'impérialisme US, au tournant des années 70.

Ce retournement, s'il fut possible, et avec l'efficacité contre-révolutionnaire qui fut rapidement la sienne, était, d'abord et avant tout, celui de la stratégie US, en échec grave dans son offensive frontale au Vietnam, échec qui était sur le point de faire basculer l'équilibre du monde dans le camp anti-impérialiste.

Ce type de confrontation était devenu, pour l'impérialisme US, une double impasse :

\_ Sur le plan militaire, entraînant toujours plus de résistance des peuples, au lieu de la soumission attendue.

\_ Sur le plan financier et économique, les crédits et dépenses militaires s'avérant largement plus coûteux que ce qu'ils pouvaient rapporter.

Si l'échec militaire pouvait encore être retardé de quelques mois ou quelques années, l'échec financier, lui, était déjà présent, impliquant la rupture des accords de Bretton Woods, qui avaient consacré la suprématie du Dollar, dans sa première manière, financièrement « à l'ancienne »...

Mais la faculté d'adaptation de l'impérialisme est grande, et surtout celle de l'impérialisme US, libéré des archaïsmes de la culture économique européenne.

Plutôt que de tenter d'enrayer la vague de spéculation née de son propre échec, il était à la fois plus facile et plus efficace d'en prendre le contrôle et d'en faire une nouvelle arme de suprématie du Dollar.

Diviser et corrompre, à l'égard des bourgeoisie nationales-bureaucratiques des nations émergentes, dites crûment « sous-développées », en ces temps primitifs, c'était désormais la « bonne stratégie... A peine Mao et Nixon venaient-ils de se lâcher la main, en 1972, que les Dollars commençaient à circuler vers la Bourse de Hong Kong, où la bureaucratie maoïste était désormais autorisée à vendre les actions de ses sociétés « nationales » aux capitalistes et boursicoteurs US.( 1 )



Dès lors, le monde de la guerre par procuration ne devait plus connaître de limites, incluant, de la part de Mao, un soutien allant du fasciste Pinochet, contre le régime supposé « pro-soviétique » d'Allende, à l'UNITA, en Angola, officine, entre autres, des racistes sud-africains, relayé, en échange, par un soutien US ultérieur aux Khmers « rouges » de Pol Pot, contre le Vietnam, et en retour, par un soutien chinois aux toutes premières manipulations US de terroristes islamistes en Afghanistan contre l'Union Soviétique, et ainsi de suite... La liste de ces sanglant « échanges de services » est en réalité presque inépuisable...

Bien évidemment ce type de tractation ne s'est pas limité aux échanges sino-US, mais concerne toutes les puissances émergentes qui tentent d'avoir un certain rayonnement régional, sinon mondial.

Aujourd'hui, on le voit plus que jamais, notamment, par exemple, avec le soutien US à l'Arabie Saoudite contre l'Iran, puis au rapprochement avec l'Iran, avec, dans chaque cas des implications envers les rapports de force sur le terrain des conflits en cours, incluant les fractions terroristes manipulées.

On le voit également avec le double et triple jeu qui se déploie autour de la Turquie, etc...

Un monde où il y a, effectivement, de quoi devenir fou, pour qui cherche à y comprendre, et tout simplement, pour ceux qui s'y sentent perdus...

Il n'est donc pas étonnant qu'une vision religieuse simplifiée à l'extrême trouve un écho parmi tous ceux que la société capitaliste en crise a marginalisés, pour des raisons qui peuvent sembler, au départ, aussi variées qu'indirectes.

Une vision qui, en quelque sorte, « diabolise » l'état de choses existant, globalement, tout à fait indépendamment des causes et des effets multiples et complexes qui ne se manifestent eux-mêmes qu'indirectement dans le monde, et ne sont que difficilement compréhensibles, au prix d'une étude ardue et tenace.

Un monde qui ne produit que des valeurs matérielles ne produit aussi que des individus sans repères, et lorsqu'il les marginalise, ils deviennent d'autant plus incontrôlables, sauf par ces manipulateurs, qui, précisément, leurs offrent cette nouvelle échelle de valeurs simplistes.

Sur-accumulation de valeurs matérielles, avec la mondialisation, marginalisation à grande échelle, avec sa crise systémique, médiatisation spectaculaire, avec le développement de l'informatique, ces trois éléments n'ont encore jamais été dans un tel rapport de proportions, pour former un mélange détonant et dévastateur, dont les fous furieux lâchés dans nos villes ne sont jamais que le produit direct.

Loin d'être des révolutionnaires, ils ne sont eux mêmes que le clou sanguinolent du spectacle, auquel ils donnent encore un sens, par antithèse.

"Lutter contre le terrorisme" devient la seule valeur qui cimente encore, de façon sporadique, le système capitaliste.

Du point de vue de nos "dirigeants" occidentaux, si les terroristes n'existaient pas, il faudrait impérativement les inventer, et à n'en pas douter, depuis la tragédie de l'Afghanistan, c'est ce qu'ils ont fait...

Et ces "terroristes incontrôlables", même s'ils ne sont que des pions joués perdus

d'avance sur l'échiquier des conflits internationaux, sont en même temps la meilleure des justifications à la prolongation infinie des guerres, en réalité néocoloniales.

Ces guerres étant le seul moyen concret par lequel l'impérialisme survit à ses propres crises, en "renouvelant" par la destruction et la mort, ses propres "débouchés", la boucle est ainsi bouclée !

Le renouvellement du système putride ( 2 ) est ainsi en marche cyclique, jusqu'à épuisement des ressources de la planète, à une échéance qui commence à devenir visible à l'échelle d'une vie, difficilement "humaine" dans ce contexte.

La seule vraie question que pose la lutte contre le terrorisme, en réalité, c'est la lutte contre l'impérialisme, qui engendre tous les conflits dont ce phénomène nouveau est issu.

Tous ces conflits, au delà de leurs prétextes officiels et de leurs causes immédiates, religieuses et ethniques, ne sont que des lieux d'affrontement pour le contrôle des ressources économiques, des marchés, et surtout, en dernière analyse, des flux financiers.

Si les guerres locales les plus sanglantes sont en quelque sorte les échiquiers de ces jeux morbides, les vrais acteurs en sont les pôles financiers qui tentent de contrôler ces flux, c'est à dire, concrètement, les pôles où se sont déjà accumulés, au cours des dernières décennies, un maximum de capitaux financiers.

Et s'il est clair que les USA restent largement devant, avec 25 935 Milliards de Dollars (NYSE + Nasdaq, Nov 2015), c'est désormais la Chine qui arrive nettement en second, avec 11 050 MD, ( Shanghai + Shenzhen + Hong Kong, Nov 2015 ), loin devant la première place européenne, Londres, qui, peu avant le "Brexit" et la dévaluation de fait de la Livre, pesait encore 6187 MD, incluant Milan, rachetée en 2007. (A noter que le rachat prévu de Francfort ( 1738 MD en Nov 2015) se trouve désormais remis en cause.).

Derrière, Tokyo, avec 4910 MD (Nov 2015), devance encore Euronext (Paris + Amsterdam + Bruxelles + Lisbonne, 3379 MD, Nov 2015)

A noter également que Moscou, qui pesait encore près de 950 M D en 2010, est passé de 770 à 385 entre 2013 et 2014 ( pas de chiffre plus récent). Ce qui relativise, et à vrai dire anéanti, l'argumentation des pseudos"marxistes révolutionnaires" qui y voient une "nouvelle puissance impérialiste" ! ( 3 )

**Avec l'affaiblissement de l'UE, c'est clairement la bipolarisation financière du monde entre les USA et la Chine qui s'accroît et devient la base réelle des tensions qui déchirent le monde.**

Quant à voir la Chine comme un nouveau pôle "anti-impérialiste", sous prétexte qu'elle n'est pas directement impliquée dans les conflits les plus médiatisés, c'est tout simplement nier la réalité de l'impérialisme moderne, qui ne réside évidemment plus essentiellement dans l'interventionnisme militaire direct, mais dans la capacité d'exportation de capitaux. Tout aussi évidemment, elle dépend d'abord de la capacité à les accumuler, et comme le montrent les chiffres, désormais, il n'y a pas d'ambiguïté possible sur le rôle de la Chine.



Voir les "BRICS" comme une sorte de "nouveau front anti-impérialiste", c'est tout autant une vue de l'esprit, particulièrement grotesque, tant il est clair qu'il s'agit d'un cartel, probablement aussi éphémère et instable que l'UE, d'inféodation à l'impérialisme chinois.

Et concernant les manœuvres d'expansionnisme territorial, la Chine est loin d'être en reste, comme le montre l'évolution récente du conflit dans la région des Spratleys ( 4 ), avec ses origines dans la période maoïste.



### **Qui veut la paix ? Qui veut la guerre ?**

Il reste évident, néanmoins, dans le contexte de la crise actuelle, que c'est l'impérialisme US qui lutte avec le plus d'agressivité pour préserver sa suprématie, même s'il reste, pour l'instant, encore très largement dominant. Il est fortement secondé en cela par les impérialismes européens décadents, dont la France, qui manifestent également une agressivité décuplée par leur recul brutal au profit de la Chine.

l'impérialisme US reste le maître d'œuvre, direct ou indirect, des manipulations terroristes qui ensanglantent la planète, et dont il espère tirer le marrons du feu, laissant quelques miettes à ses alliés européens.

Mais cette multiplicité des conflits locaux exclue-t-elle un embrasement généralisé entre le pôle US ancien et le pôle chinois "émergent" ? Il suffit de voir les déclarations officielles des uns et des autres à propos du conflit autour des Spratleys pour voir qu'il n'en est rien.

Il ne s'agit, pour l'instant, que d'un "round d'observation", mais il est clair que personne ne veut céder, dans cette affaire, un seul pouce de terrain, même s'il s'agit ap-

paremment d'îlots sablonneux, tant leur importance stratégique est grande, tant en termes de ressources maritimes, que de passages commerciaux, et évidemment, de contrôle militaire.



### **Les peuples du monde veulent-ils la guerre ou la paix ?**

En pleine période de guerre au Vietnam, et quelques mois à peine avant la célèbre poignée de main Mao-Nixon, la Chine faisait encore de la surenchère en critiquant la politique "pacifiste" de l'URSS à l'égard de l'impérialisme US... A Paris, les maoïstes défilaient encore en chantant "le peuple veut la guerre !"

Même si les "dirigeants" maoïstes français ont, dès cette époque, liquidé leurs propres organisations pour des raisons qui n'avaient pas forcément un rapport direct avec l'opportunisme de leur "grand leader", une culture de l'« initiative violente » a persisté dans la pseudo "extrême-gauche" française, sans toutefois atteindre les de-

grés connus en Allemagne et en Italie.

Comment comprendre la différence entre les luttes de résistances populaires réelles et les simagrées morbides qu'en ont fait les "gauchistes" européens ?

Le meilleur exemple, pour cela, est récent, et en Europe, qui plus est...

La résistance populaire du Donbass n'est pas le fruit d'une poignée d'illuminés ayant décrété la "guerre du peuple" planqués derrière leur ordinateur.

Elle est née en réaction au coup d'état fasciste de l'"Euromaïdan", et en exprimant d'abord massivement et pacifiquement les revendications légitimes du peuple russo-phonie du Sud-Est Ukrainien.

Ce mouvement populaire massif a d'abord clairement mis en lumière la volonté répressive des fascistes de Kiev pour briser leurs aspirations et nier leurs droits les plus élémentaires. ( 5 )

C'est alors que s'est exprimée massivement la volonté populaire pour un rattachement à la Russie, solution qui paraissait la plus évidente pour garantir leurs droits à disposer d'eux-même, à court terme, et retrouver une vie économique et sociale supportable, comme l'exemple de la Crimée le laissait entrevoir.

C'est l'incapacité de la Russie à répondre à cette aspiration qui a finalement propulsé les "nationalistes indépendantistes" sur le devant de la scène locale, et poussé le mouvement de masse dans cette nouvelle direction.



Mais quoi qu'il en soit des rapports de forces internationaux qui ont influé sur cette situation, les deux tendances, partisans "novorussiens" du rattachement ou "indépendantistes", étaient des mouvement déjà largement implantés dans les masses populaires et dont l'enracinement était le fruit d'un travail politique de longue

durée.

Bien évidemment, cette lutte connaît déjà toutes les limites que rencontre une lutte populaire de libération nationale en l'absence d'un parti prolétarien capable de faire durablement le lien entre les aspects anti-impérialistes et antifascistes au sens large et les aspects sociaux qui nécessitent une perspective anticapitaliste clairement définie, à plus long terme.

Néanmoins, il est clair que le potentiel existe pour l'émergence d'une telle alternative, comme l'exprime, notamment, le "manifeste social" d'Alexeï Mozgovoï ( 6 ). Ce qui explique la grande popularité de ce leader, déjà quasi-légendaire de son vivant, ainsi que la répression particulièrement violente dont il fut victime.



Ce que montre cette lutte, comme tant d'autres, c'est que le peuple ne veut pas la guerre, mais la paix, et lorsque ses droits fondamentaux sont remis en cause, il n'est pas non plus décidé à ramper et à se soumettre. Organisé pour défendre ses droits, il peut se soulever pour les affirmer, et organiser la résistance, réelle et efficace, pour les faire aboutir.

Mais l'initiative de la violence sociale, c'est la réaction qui en est responsable, parce qu'elle repose dessus, comme tout système d'oppression. La résistance populaire naît et s'enracine avec la prise de conscience de cette réalité, et non par la "violence exemplaire" de quelques illuminés.

Être conscients de ce processus, travailler à l'expression massive des aspirations populaires, tout en ouvrant une perspective politique nouvelle, pour le socialisme réel, et en organisant durablement la résistance, c'est toute la différence entre révolutionnaires et terroristes.

<http://www.agoravox.fr/>

## Thomson Reuters' Terrorism Database Cites Wikipedia as a Source

July 1, 2016



On Tuesday, a [security researcher](#) obtained a mid-2014 copy of Thomson Reuters' controversial financial crime and terrorism database—a huge cache of publicly sourced information used by banks, lawyers, and governments to research individuals and organisations.

Just like your tutor might discover dodgy references in that late-night essay hastily cobbled together, Motherboard has found that a chunk of profiles in the database use Wikipedia as a source.

Thomson Reuters' database, called World-Check, is used by over 300 government and intelligence agencies, as well as 49 of the world's top 50 banks, [according to a company fact sheet](#). World-Check is designed to give insight into financial crime and the people potentially behind it.

“We monitor over 530 sanction, watch, and regulatory law and enforcement lists, and hundreds of thousands of information sources, often identifying heightened-risk entities months or years before they are listed. In fact, in 2012 alone we identified more than 180 entities before they appeared on the US Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) list based on reputable sources identifying relevant risks,” [the Thomson Reuters website reads](#).

You might not expect one of those sources to be Wikipedia.

According to Motherboard's analysis, over 15,000 entries in the World-Check database reference [wikipedia.org](#) as a source. These include profiles which have been designated as “political individual,” “diplomat,” and “terrorism.”

Over 6,500 of the profiles that include Wikipedia sources are for political individuals, 5074 are for other individuals, 624 are labeled as being involved in some form of crime, such as narcotics or financial, and 178 are suspected of terrorism.

Although Wikipedia can be a good source of information, some of the articles cited by World-Check are incomplete or of low quality.

One profile of a suspected, and deceased, terrorist links to a Wikipedia “stub.” According to [Wikipedia's own definition](#), a stub “is an article deemed too short to provide encyclopedic coverage of a subject.” Another article for a political individual is

marked as being “too short and lacks important information.” The profiles do include other citations, however, such as media reports.

As VICE News found earlier this year, major charities, activists, and mainstream religious institutions are listed in the World-Check database under the label of “terrorism,” despite facing no related charges. Some of these designations were given in part because of information found on blogs, according to VICE News.

Of course, 15,000 profiles is only a tiny part of World-Checks' 2.2 million strong database, and including information from Wikipedia—alongside other sources, of course—isn't necessarily a bad thing.

David Crundwell, a spokesperson from Thomson Reuters, told Motherboard in an email that, "World-Check uses only reliable and reputable public domain sources (such as official sanctions lists, law and regulatory enforcement lists, government sources and trustworthy media publications) for risk-based information or allegations about an individual or entity.”

“We also provide secondary identifying information on individuals, such as dates and place of birth, and this will be similarly verified with reputable and official sources. If blog content appears, it is only as a supporting source for that secondary information, and is clearly identified as such,” Crundwell added.

<http://motherboard.vice.com/>

## Kenya

### Kenya's Coast: Devolution Disappointed

13 Jul 2016



#### OVERVIEW

The huge public expectations raised by devolved government on Kenya's coast have turned into disappointment. Patronage politics that marked the former centralised system has been replicated in the new counties, making government even more inefficient and expensive. Though political leadership is now local, power is closely held, and leaders are suspicious of both national and local rivals. Certain regions, communities and many youth still feel marginalised. Political devolution has deflected but not resolved grievances that fuel militancy, which continues to be met by hard security measures driven from Nairobi. Greater inclusion and cooperation within and between county governments, as well as national-county dialogue, is needed to maximise devolution's potential and ensure militant groups, like Al-Shabaab, have fewer grievances to exploit.

The 2010 constitution prescribes partnership between national and county institutions; instead there is competition and confrontation (at least for now peaceful). The former Coast province is divided into six new coastal county governments. They are caught between the popular and still potent idea of *majimbo* – greater political and economic autonomy and authority devolved to the regions – and a central government that expects them to focus on service delivery and only play a parochial political role that many dismiss in frustration as *vijimbo* (little regions). National government (including the president) have undertaken a number of high-profile, if piece-

meal, initiatives that the coastal county elite has interpreted as a challenge to the spirit of devolution and its local political primacy. In response, leading coastal politicians are stirring up local discontent and threatening unilateral takeover of key revenue resources such as Mombasa port. However, the coastal retreat into defensive regionalism is likely only to exacerbate county-capital frictions, not extract concessions from the national government.

The tension between national and county government is not unique to the coast, but coastal grievances, historical and current, are particularly acute and have fuelled the recent rise in nativist and Islamist-inspired militancy. Militant networks, though damaged and presently dormant, are by no means dismantled, and parallel networks of urban youth gangs and armed political entourages make for a still combustible mix. The coastal counties also remain an opposition stronghold into which the ruling party would like to make inroads. This risks a convergence of national and local political competition in the 2017 elections of a sort that in the past has produced communal tensions and localised violence.

The gulf of mistrust – exploited by all sides – not only limits the full delivery of devolution’s benefits; in the case of the coastal counties, it also undermines efforts to combat militancy and attendant violence now subsumed under a “countering violent extremism” (CVE) agenda that is a priority of both Nairobi and its international partners. Rather than focus solely on building the capacity of the security and intelligence services, international assistance to counter radicalisation should give equal and increasing emphasis to outreach and reconciliation, so as to find political common ground and articulate and address the region’s grievances within the coast’s newly devolved political structures.

A renewed civic education campaign to underline the potential gains of devolution, as well as the responsibilities and roles of county government and its elected representatives, is urgently needed. Promising initiatives like the “Commonwealth of Coast Counties” (Jumiya Ya Kaunti Za Pwani, JKP), which aim to amplify the benefits of county government through regional (cross-county) projects, need to be depoliticised and given technical support by relevant national ministries and authorities and multilateral institutions (eg, the World Bank). There should be greater institutionalisation of welcome, but currently ad hoc, interventions toward resolving long-term land grievances, specifically the regularisation rather than wholesale redistribution of land titles.

Overall, renewed reconciliation work is needed at all levels in the coastal counties ahead of elections; specifically, national and county governments and donors need to reach a renewed understanding of the role and limits of civil society and community-based organisations (CSOs and CBOs), which are still best placed to identify and diffuse potential conflict flashpoints at local levels. The promotion of greater partnership between national and county governments (even as a regional bloc) should be a security and developmental priority for Kenya and its partners.

**Nairobi/Brussels, 13 July 2016**

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/>



## How Anti-Terrorism Tactics Are Being Used to Fight Elephant Poaching

July 13, 2016

While working as a counterterrorism intelligence agent for the US Air Force in Africa, tracking Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army, Lieutenant Colonel Faye



Cuevas wasn't particularly interested in elephants. But the animals kept popping up during her surveillance operations.

"We would see them all the time: elephants and cows," Cuevas told me over the phone. "To me, initially, where elephants were was really, I don't want to say irrelevant, but I didn't understand the relevance to my mission."

But she soon learned that the elephants could be a signal for valuable information: if the elephants felt safe enough to be in a certain area, it usually meant bad guys weren't close by. The connection between wildlife and criminal activity made something click in Cuevas's head.

"I heard professional conservationists explain the poaching crisis and to my ears, as an intelligence analyst, it sounded an awful lot like [fighting] a terror or insurgent network," Cuevas said.

So she started to volunteer, finding ways to lend her counterterrorism intelligence skills to the fight against elephant poachers. Last November, after 19 years of military service, she joined IFAW officially as Chief of Staff, heading its anti-poaching program in Kenya—a partnership with the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) [called tenBoma](#). Cuevas is still an active reserve intelligence officer with Air Force, but she spends most of her time these days applying her skills to a different kind of fight. And it's working.



IFAW Chief of Staff, Faye Cuevas shows two KWS rangers how to use the mobile phone app used to collect anti-poaching data. Image: IFAW

In 2012 and 2013, elephant and rhino poaching in Kenya reached an all time high, with [more than 300 elephants](#) slaughtered by poachers by the end of 2013. At the rate elephants are still being poached across Africa, conservationists estimate the species could become extinct in [as little as 10 years](#). Over the last three years, the Kenyan government has cracked down on poaching, beefing up the KWS and [enacting stricter laws](#). Things have improved: the total number of elephants killed in Kenya dropped [from 384](#) in 2012 to [96 in 2015](#) and the birth rate for elephants in East Africa [currently outpaces](#) the rate at which the animals are being killed. But the overall problem persists, and Kenya remains a thoroughfare for poached ivory from other parts of Africa on its way to Asia. That’s why IFAW and KWS are doubling down on new strategies, including a more tactical approach.

For years, KWS has kept detailed data on poaching and wildlife numbers, mostly filed away in cabinets. The tenBoma team pulled out six years’ worth of elephant mortality data and did historical trend pattern analysis to identify poaching hotspots. They noticed that in one particular area, the southern ranchlands, poaching activity would spike just before each of the two annual rainy seasons, in the spring and fall. So, KWS brought a targeted presence just before the first rainy period this year—surveying the area, talking to locals, doing vehicle stops.

“We’d seen an uptick in poaching activity for the last six years, but this year we saw zero reports of poaching,” Cuevas told me. “That was at the end of February and as of today there are still zero reports of poaching from that location.”

Her tactics go beyond analyzing stacks of data. Before joining the US Special Operations Command Africa, Cuevas was deployed multiple times to Iraq and Afghanistan, working as a counterterrorist intelligence analyst. One method she used there is a US military targeting cycle (kind of like a step-by-step intelligence guide) [called F3EAD](#): it stands for find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, disseminate. Over the last few weeks, Cuevas and her team have deployed this structure against poachers in

Kenya for the first time.

Using the F3EAD strategy, the tenBoma team facilitated a KWS-led operation using informants to track one tentacle of the [ivory poaching network](#) and target higher level nodes within it. They did a sting operation, buying illegal ivory and making arrests, and conducting mobile device forensic analysis on scene. They were able to crack into an ivory broker's phone and extract 450 pages of information detailing the whole operation: photos, text messages, geolocation data. From there, they were able to identify other tentacles of the network, and share the information with government authorities.

These methods aren't going to end the ivory trafficking industry overnight. But Cuevas believes that using the military's tried and true strategies can have an impact down the road.

"Even though [poaching] is described as war," Cuevas said. "No one was taking a military strategy."

## Nigeria

### The next Boko Haram? Nigerian attacks raise fears of new 'terror' threat



A woman in Benue State, north-central Nigeria. More than 80 people have been killed in the region in recent clashes. Photograph: Emmanuel Arewa/AFP/Getty Images

Deadly clashes between nomadic herdsman and locals have escalated but analysts blame land scarcity not Islamic extremism

More than 80 people are thought to have been killed in a series of brutal attacks in Benue State in central [Nigeria](#), which locals say were perpetrated by groups of nomadic herdsman.

Although northern herdsman have fought with locals over land and grazing rights for decades, what was a low-level conflict has recently spiralled into a full-blown crisis, leading to claims the men are “the new Boko Haram”.

On Monday [#Benuemassacre](#) began trending on social media on Monday as Nigerians criticised the government’s delayed response to the escalating conflict.

Reliable statistics on the total number of people killed are scarce, but according to the Global Terrorism Index, 1,200 people were killed in 2014 by herdsman, and [in 2015 the Index claimed they were](#) “the fourth deadliest terror group in the world”.

<https://www.theguardian.com/>

## Tortures, exécutions, détentions : le rapport qui accable l'armée camerounaise dans sa lutte contre Boko Haram

14.07.2016



A la lecture du dernier rapport d'Amnesty [International](#) sur le [Cameroun](#), on résiste mal à la tentation de se [demander](#) qui, de [Boko Haram](#) ou des forces [armées](#) camerounaises, fait le plus de victimes. Pour l'organisation terroriste, c'est environ 500 civils en 2015 et 480 depuis le début 2016. Dans la moitié des 46 attentats-suicides de la secte djihadiste ces derniers mois, ce sont des filles qui transportaient et déclenchaient les explosifs.

Boko Haram a délibérément visé des civils par des attaques contre des marchés, des mosquées, des églises, des écoles et des gares routières. Les attaques ont atteint leur paroxysme entre novembre 2015 et janvier 2016. On en dénombrait alors une tous les trois jours.

Pour les victimes des forces de sécurité, le décompte est plus difficile. Les chercheurs d'Amnesty ont multiplié les entretiens, plus de 200, analysé les images satellites d'un village dont les maisons ont été incendiées par les forces de sécurité, assisté à des [procès](#) devant le tribunal militaire de Maroua, le chef-lieu de la région de l'Extrême-Nord, et ont eu accès à des documents judiciaires. Leur rapport, intitulé « Bonne cause, mauvais moyens : atteintes aux droits humains et à la [justice](#) dans le cadre de la lutte contre Boko Haram au Cameroun », publié jeudi 14 juillet à Yaoundé, fait suite à [un précédent](#) de septembre 2015. Il est néanmoins beaucoup plus accablant pour les autorités et les forces de sécurité camerounaises. En voici les points principaux. Le rapport complet, avec tous les témoignages, [est à lire ici](#).

**Disparitions forcées et détention au secret** Amnesty International a recueilli des informations concernant 17 cas de [disparitions](#) forcées récentes au nord du Cameroun, en plus de 130 habitants des villages de Magdeme et Doublé, dont on

reste sans nouvelles depuis décembre 2014. En outre, 40 personnes sont détenues au secret dans des centres de détention non officiels, en particulier dans des bases militaires du Bataillon d'intervention rapide (BIR, les forces spéciales camerounaises).

**Exécutions extra-judiciaires** En novembre 2014, lors d'une opération dans le village de Bornori, des hommes du BIR ont exécuté illégalement au moins sept civils non armés et ont arrêté 15 hommes, avant de [revenir](#) dans les semaines suivantes pour [incendier](#) des maisons.

**Morts en détention** Les 15 hommes arrêtés à Bornori ont été emmenés à la base du BIR à Salak, près de Maroua, où ils ont été détenus au secret pendant une vingtaine de jours. Beaucoup y ont été torturés et l'un d'eux est décédé. Ils ont ensuite été transférés à la prison de Maroua, où quatre autres sont morts.

**Brutalités contre les civils.** Lors d'une autre opération en juillet 2015 à Kouyapé, des soldats de l'[armée](#) régulière ont rassemblé environ 70 personnes avant de les [agresser](#). Un soir du même mois, un soldat a tiré dans la jambe d'un étudiant de 19 ans à Koza, car il ne voulait pas [donner](#) le code de son téléphone après [avoir](#) été arrêté par une patrouille.

**Dénonciations douteuses** Les forces de sécurité semblent souvent [agir](#) en s'appuyant sur des dénonciations douteuses ou sur des causes indirectes, comme le fait de ne pas avoir de carte d'identité ou de s'être rendu au [Nigeria](#). A Kossa, village accusé d'approvisionner Boko Haram en nourriture, 32 hommes ont été rassemblés et arrêtés en février 2015. La plupart d'entre eux ont été libérés plus tard, mais un homme est mort en détention.

**Actes de torture** L'ONG a dénombré 25 cas de personnes ayant subi des actes de torture lors de leur détention à la base militaire du BIR à Salak, près de Maroua, et au moins quatre autres à la base du BIR à Mora et au siège de la Direction générale de la recherche extérieure (DGRE), à Yaoundé. Amnesty a recensé quatre cas de personnes décédées en détention à la suite de tels actes de torture.

**Journaliste violenté** Lors de sa détention à la DGRE à Yaoundé, le journaliste de RFI Ahmed Abba a été déshabillé et passé à [tabac](#). Il n'a eu aucun contact avec son avocat ou sa [famille](#) pendant plus de trois mois.

**Prison mortelle** A la prison de Maroua, les autorités pénitentiaires estiment qu'entre six et huit détenus meurent en moyenne chaque mois en raison de conditions sanitaires déplorables et de l'extrême surpopulation. L'établissement compte plus de 1 470 détenus pour une capacité de 350. Plus de 800 d'entre eux sont accusés de [soutenir](#) Boko Haram et 80 % n'ont pas encore été jugés.

**Familles arrêtées** En juillet 2015, plus de 250 personnes ont été arrêtées et emprisonnées alors qu'elles rendaient visite à des membres de leur famille à la prison de Maroua.

**Condamnations à mort** Plus de 100 personnes, dont des femmes, ont été condamnées à mort par le tribunal militaire de Maroua depuis juillet 2015. Aucune n'a toutefois été exécutée à ce jour.

**Dormir avec des cadavres** Un vieil homme de 70 ans détenu à Salak a confié à

Amnesty International qu'il avait vu des soldats du BIR [torturer](#) son fils pendant dix jours et deux détenus frappés à mort. « *Ils [les agents de sécurité] leur donnaient de grands coups de pied, les giflaient violemment et les frappaient avec des bâtons. Ils sont morts devant nous.* » Le vieil homme a ajouté : « *Je n'ai pas été battu, car je suis vieux. C'est donc moi qui les ai aidés à [sortir] les deux corps de la salle d'interrogatoire. Cette nuit-là, nous avons dormi dans la cellule avec deux cadavres.* »

Amnesty International a partagé ses conclusions avec les autorités camerounaises dès le 7 mai 2016, mais n'a pas reçu de réponse. L'organisation reconnaît pourtant la situation d'extrême urgence dans laquelle s'est retrouvé le pays lorsque la secte islamiste d'origine nigériane a investi le nord du Cameroun. « *A la suite des exactions du groupe armé, plus de 170 000 personnes au Cameroun, principalement des femmes et des enfants, ont fui leur foyer et sont à présent déplacées à l'intérieur de leur pays, dans toute la région de l'Extrême-Nord, écrit-elle. Le Cameroun a également accueilli environ 65 000 réfugiés ayant fui les attaques de Boko Haram au Nigeria.* »

Il n'empêche, Amnesty estime que [répondre](#) à la terreur par la terreur est une erreur. « *En cherchant à [protéger](#) la [population](#) de la violence de Boko Haram, le Cameroun vise le bon objectif, mais en arrêtant arbitrairement des gens, en les torturant et en les soumettant à des disparitions forcées, il n'emploie pas les bons moyens pour [parvenir](#) à l'objectif visé* », a déclaré jeudi 14 juillet Alioune Tine, directeur du bureau régional d'Amnesty International pour l'[Afrique](#) centrale et de l'Ouest.

En savoir plus sur <http://www.lemonde.fr/>

## Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism In Nigeria – Analysis



*A Boko Haram flying near the Bosso post on the Niger-Nigeria border, near Lake Chad. Photo credit: European Commission DG ECHO.*

JUNE 30, 2016

As the Nigerian government continues its fight against Boko Haram, Obuseh Jude discusses four mutually reinforcing elements to strengthen its approach.

The Federal Government of Nigeria must be commended for the impressive strides its security forces have so far made in the war against Boko Haram. The string of successive victories the federal forces have recorded over the insurgents, in conjunction with their sub-regional allies from Cameroon, Niger and Chad, is proof of the effectiveness of the new stratagem to the conflict and seems to have radically transformed the symmetry of the raging war in the north-east.

However, laudable as these efforts are, they seem not to be able to counter planned acts of terrorism from being committed, or deter future plans. They remain palliative measures that cannot dissuade extremist groups bent on mass murder from executing their pernicious acts. This piece postulates four mutually re-enforcing elements that can help in building resilience against terrorism in Nigeria.

These elements are: prevention, which will create a Nigeria that is resistant to violent extremism; detection and denial, which will ensure that Nigeria is able to identify terrorist acts early, and make itself a difficult target for would-be terrorists; and response, which will engender a resilient society that is able to bounce back quickly when terrorist incidents occur.



## Preventing attacks

The preventive element focuses on the factors that motivate individuals who engage in, or have the potential to engage in, terrorist activities at home and abroad. Nigerian security agencies must strive to diminish these factors by engaging with individuals, communities, and international partners, and through research to better understand them and how to counter them. The desired outcome of this element is to build resilience in the psyche of Nigerians to challenge violent extremist ideologies by producing effective narratives to counter it and reduce the risk of individuals succumbing to violent extremism and radicalisation.

## Detecting terrorist activity

On its own, detection is a knowledge-powered element. It is based on the idea that countering terrorist threats requires knowledge of the terrorist themselves, their capabilities and the nature of their plans. It also seeks to identify the supporters of terrorist activities. This can be done through investigation, intelligence operations for analysis, which can also lead to criminal prosecution.

Detection requires strong intelligence capacity and capabilities, as well as a solid understanding of the strategic drivers of the threat environment, and extensive collaboration and information sharing with domestic and international partners. The desired outcome of this element is to identify terrorist threats in a timely fashion by putting into place an efficient alert mechanism that ensures that terrorist activities are effectively monitored and reported. It must also ensure that information is proactively shared within Nigeria and with key allies and non-traditional partners.

The denial element aims to deny terrorists the means and opportunity to carry out their activities in order to protect Nigerians and Nigerian interests. Investigation and law enforcement actions, prosecutions, and domestic and international cooperation are necessary to mitigate vulnerabilities and aggressively intervene in terrorist planning.

The end goal is to make Nigerian interests a more difficult target for would-be terrorists. The objective of this is to develop a strong ability to counter terrorist activities at home and abroad by speedily concluding prosecutions, diminishing the opportunity to support terrorist activities and maintaining strong cooperation with key allies and non-traditional partners.

## Responding effectively

Finally, the response element aims to respond quickly and effectively to terrorist activities and mitigate their effects. Nigeria can do this by creating a fluid emergency response system to mitigate the frightening effects of terrorist acts. This would include developing a first strike capability to either act to forestall an impending terrorist act or to immediately commence the process of tracking down perpetrators of terrorist acts but also launching public enlightenment campaigns to raise public awareness about terrorist activities in order to open up windows of trust between the public and security services, and prepare the civil populace to absorb the shocks of terrorist acts when they occur. This element would deter would-be terrorists from carrying out their dastardly acts, to make them insecure if they actually do, and to embolden Nigerians to stand together against terrorism and its perpetrators.

As opined at the beginning of this article, government's anti-terrorism measures are well intentioned, but they need to be more comprehensive, proactive and flexible to be effective tools for fighting and defeating a foe as formidable as the new face of terrorism currently facing Nigeria. The counter-terrorism strategies treated in this piece are suggestions that can be added to what the government has already done, as it marries ideas from several practical examples.

The fight against terrorism and other acts of violent criminal behaviour requires a multi-dimensional approach. If square pegs are put in square holes by those charged with securing the lives and property of Nigerians, terrorism and other violent acts can be fought to a standstill.

**About the author:**

\*Obuseh Jude is a peace researcher and practitioner, and the Executive Director of the [Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Initiative](#), a Nigerian based non-governmental organisation. He holds a BSc in Political Science, an MA in Peace and Conflict Studies from the premier University of Ibadan, Nigeria, coupled with other professional qualifications. His areas of research interests are international security administration, peacebuilding strategies and early warning mechanisms.

<http://www.eurasiareview.com/>

## Somalia

# AMISOM's withdrawal preparations reduce supply-chain risks and facilitate UN authorisation for a peace-keeping mission in Somalia post-2017

13 July 2016



Maman S Sidikou, special representative of the chair of AMISOM, and Somalia's prime minister, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, talk

## Key Points

- AMISOM members are discussing a strategy for how to support the regional mission in Somalia after European Union (EU) funding expires in 2017.
- The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is likely to authorise a peace-keeping mission, but this first requires greater co-operation between AMISOM members and improvements in the security situation.

Ahead of elections scheduled for August, AMISOM is likely to embark on an offensive surge, focusing on securing strategic logistical routes in Gedo and Middle Jubba regions, and thereby reducing risks to ground cargo and to humanitarian and NGO operations.

## EVENT

An African Union (AU) summit on 10-18 July is likely to determine the funding and mandate for the regional AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which announced on 6 July it would begin a staged withdrawal from 2018 to 2020.

### **Funding constraints**

The African Union Mission in Somalia's (AMISOM's) announcement of its plans for withdrawing from Somalia coincides with ongoing discussions between contributing states, African Union (AU) members, the United Nations, and the European Union (EU) over how the mission should be funded. The EU is set to withdraw funding by the end of AMISOM's UN mandate on 31 May 2017, as it seeks to re-prioritise the financing of counter-terrorism operations against the Islamic State in the Sahel region. The EU has already increased funding from EUR750 million to EUR900 million for 2014-16 but provoked condemnation from Kenya and Uganda in February when it imposed an 80% ceiling on contributions to troop wages to sustain the mission until 2017.

AMISOM members are unwilling to increase contributions as this would result in a net reduction to national defence expenditure. Uganda's draft 2016/17 budget, which is due to be finalised by 30 July, anticipates that AMISOM will contribute 32% of planned defence expenditure. Uganda provides AMISOM's largest troop contribution, in addition to significant administrative and communicative support, and these budgetary losses likely motivated its announcement in June it would withdraw forces by December 2017.

<http://www.janes.com/article/>

# Securing Somalia, Whatever the Cost

Analysis

JULY 5, 2016

## Summary

Somalia has posed a key security challenge for the international community in recent decades. Islamic extremism, warlords, famine and piracy have cemented the country's reputation as a failed state. Since it formed in 2007, however, the 22,000-strong African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) force has helped to stabilize



Officers from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) patrol in Mogadishu in 2015. After the European Union announced cuts to its AMISOM funding, some participating African countries have threatened to withdraw.

the country, [making notable gains](#) against the militant group al Shabaab.


Notwithstanding the force's successes, the European Union, AMISOM's largest financial contributor, decided recently to cut funding to the mission by 20 percent. For African member states with troops on the frontlines, the decision has been hard to accept. Reports have circulated that AMISOM soldiers have not been paid in months and likely will not receive wages again until the European Union resumes funding in September. Now, countries such as Kenya and Uganda have threatened to pull out of AMISOM, and Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta has vowed that participating Afri-

can states will not fill the funding gap left by the European Union's cuts. Despite their grumbling, African member states have too much at stake in [war-torn Somalia](#) to leave the country anytime soon.


### Analysis

Money alone does not drive AMISOM. Although the mission's soldiers receive wages well above the average in their home countries, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi and Djibouti each have other distinct reasons for participating. Ethiopia and Kenya share long, porous borders with Somalia, and both have suffered [attacks by al Shabaab](#). Furthermore, a security vacuum in neighboring Somalia provides a haven for rebels from neighboring countries — such as Ethiopia's Ogaden militias. This explains why Kenya and Ethiopia have unilaterally intervened in Somalia in the past.

## African Union Mission In Somalia (AMISOM), January 2015



Officially given its mandate by the U.N. Security Council nine years ago, AMISOM is a multilateral peacekeeping force.



Copyright Stratfor 2016 www.stratfor.com

But even countries without borders with Somalia, such as [Uganda](#), have a significant stake in preventing collapse in the Horn of Africa. AMISOM has proved effective in steadying Somalia. Since the mission began, the Somali government and international forces have regained control of most of the country's urban centers and ports as well as its entire coastline. The country's leadership, once selected by clan delegates rather than elected through a popular vote, has become a technically full-fledged government. In addition, Somali diaspora investment into the country has increased, and the government hopes that more conventional foreign direct investment will fol-

low. For a small African country such as Burundi or a landlocked one such as Uganda, committing resources to an important regional conflict can garner international attention and increase visibility. External funding can also enable cash-starved states to subsidize larger militaries.

#### More Trouble for Somalia

As African governments threaten action over the financial cuts, Uganda has announced that it will pull its approximately 6,700 troops from Somalia in late 2017. The decision could have serious ramifications. Uganda's withdrawal would coincide with Somalia's End of Transition Roadmap, which stipulates, among other things, that the country must have democratic elections by August 2016. Consequently, the new Somali government would have only about a year to consolidate its power or for the international donor community to find replacement troops.

Because security gaps remain throughout the country and terrorist attacks still plague its capital, any lapse in security could result in a reversal of Somalia's gains, even if a different nation's troops came in to compensate. Moreover, if other AMISOM members follow Uganda's lead, an unlikely outcome at this point, regional stability would come under significant threat. International training missions have cultivated a small contingent of professionally capable forces in Somalia's military. Even so, the Somali military is still a mostly ragtag and corrupt force, too weak to take on a resurgent al Shabaab on its own.

Meanwhile, Somalia faces other challenges on the horizon. Kenya's government wants to shut down the numerous refugee camps in its country. Combined, the camps house hundreds of thousands of people, many of whom fled Somalia. Kenya's president has insisted that the camps will be closed starting in November, citing concerns that they may harbor al Shabaab militants. Though the United Nations and the United States have expressed worry over the situation, Kenya has been adamant that it will carry out the task. It remains to be seen how Kenya would go about shutting down the camps — which more closely resemble cities — and repatriating Somali refugees. The undertaking would almost certainly strain aid supplies and create a humanitarian crisis, likely increasing Kenya's own instability in the process. Given the dire consequences the camps' closure would unleash — and the blowback to Kenya — Kenya's threats may be an attempt to draw international attention and funding back to the Horn of Africa now that [they have shifted to crises elsewhere](#).

#### A Possible Solution

Unconfirmed reports suggest that the United Nations is considering converting the AMISOM force to a U.N. peacekeeping mission. This could prove beneficial in two ways. First, it would allow the United Nations to draw on a host of different countries if an African state were to pull out. Second, it would likely offer more stable funding less reliant on the European Union. But for now, any possible conversion remains a long way off, especially since the United Nations has already increased peacekeeping forces elsewhere, including [in Mali](#).

AMISOM and its international partners have made great strides in reversing some of the territorial control that Somali militants have enjoyed in recent years. Their efforts have taken pressure off the nascent Somali government, enabling it to proceed with its transition. So regardless of the hardship that budget cuts will cause the mission's African governments, their interest in Somalia's success will likely compel

them to continue their support for the time being.

<https://www.stratfor.com/>



## South Africa

### Is South Africa vulnerable to ISIS terrorism activities on its soil?

12 July 2016 4:48 PM

Recent reports of Isis recruitment in South Africa have raised concerns of whether there are more people in the country becoming involved in Isis terrorism activities.

This week, twin brothers, Brandon-Lee Thulsie and Tony-Lee Thulsie, 24, were charged with conspiring to blow up various Jewish institutions and a U.S. mission in South Africa.

John Maytham spoke to Jasmine Opperman, Africa Director for the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, about the possibilities of Isis setting up in South Africa.

Opperman says that there are people who are showing interest in what Isis is doing, more so as Isis is not shy about its propaganda campaign.

The message of Isis is being spread, and there is a response, but this remain individual cases. There is no evidence at this point in time directing toward active cells planning attacks

— *Jasmine Opperman, Africa Director for the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium*

I think as the public in South Africa, we must just take a step back and says the reality of Isis's presence in South Africa is here we cannot ignore it.

— *Jasmine Opperman, Africa Director for the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium*

Opperman went on to talk about the Isis recruitment process. She says it starts on an individual targeted subjects by individual recruiters, who then form a recruitment cell, and recruits are then placed in operational positions.

In order to execute its mandate, Isis does not need a lot of people. It relies rather on individuals, who know exactly what to do in order to execute an attack, she says.

The message now to its supporters is that wherever you are based and you execute an attack, that will be of equal importance, and a contribution towards what they believe the course is all about. South Africa cannot isolate itself from this

— *Jasmine Opperman, Africa Director for the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium*

The fact that South Africa has managed to make only four arrest in a year is concerning says Opperman. She says South Africa needs to develop a broader strategy where it will be difficult for Isis to execute attacks.

<http://www.capetalk.co.za/>

## Terrorism in the World

### China

## ISIS recruits from China don't fit a typical profile – and Beijing may be partially to blame

July 20 2016



Uighur men pray in a mosque in Hotan, in China's western Xinjiang region, on April 16, 2015. (Greg Baker/Agence France-Press via Getty Images)

As the Islamic State's power grew dramatically over the past few years, the group's ability to attract foreign recruits to fight in Syria and Iraq has confounded observers.

The threat posed by European and North American citizens who have traveled to join the group and may now help coordinate terrorist attacks back home is widely acknowledged. But perhaps less understood is the role that Chinese citizens are playing in the Islamic State's self-proclaimed caliphate in Iraq and Syria.

Chinese state media has suggested that as many as 300 Chinese Muslims may have joined the group. Some experts have disputed this figure, but a recent report [from the New America](#) think tank has found evidence of at least 118 fighters, suggesting that Beijing's estimate could be plausible.

The report offers a partial yet detailed view of how Chinese Islamic State fighters differ from their peers. And, more pointedly, it suggests that Beijing's policies may

be driving some of China's Muslim minority Uighurs to extremism.

Internal fighter registration forms collected by the Islamic State between mid-2013 and mid-2014, which were leaked to media organizations this year, form the basis of the report. These documents were essentially the organization's attempt to catalogue the masses of fighters joining the Islamic State. Recruits were asked details about their background — where they were from, their educational history, whom they brought with them, etc. — and these details were recorded by the organization's nascent bureaucracy.

These partial and self-recorded details have to be taken with a pinch of salt. But Nate Rosenblatt, the researcher who went through the documents, uncovered some interesting details about the typical Islamic State fighter. The average birth year was 1987, and the average age of a fighter 26 or 27. About 59 percent were single, and 23 percent were married with children. There was a variety of education levels (32 percent reported having received a high-school degree or its equivalent), and most had traveled to about zero to three countries before enlisting with the Islamic State.

What's perhaps most interesting about fighters from China is that they don't fit the pattern for Islamic State fighters. The report details 118 fighters from China, of whom 114 came from Xinjiang, an autonomous region in the country's northwest that is largely populated by Uighurs, a Muslim minority with a history distinct from the dominant Han Chinese. Many had listed the name of their home as Turkestan or East Turkestan, a name used to refer to the region when it declared independence in the 1930s and 1940s that dissidents still use today.

Compared with other fighters, Chinese Islamic State recruits were more likely to be married and have a family (some forms showed the family had joined the fighter on his trip to the Islamic State). Their age varied dramatically — one fighter was 80, another was listed as just 10. More than 70 percent had never traveled abroad before, and many had little education — not a single one had attended university. The report says their professional experience was "equivalent to an unskilled laborer."

The length and cost of the trip to territory held by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq suggests that it would have been a major decision for the fighters. That many brought their families along indicates that this wasn't a short-term decision to chase adventure.

China's relationship with its Uighur minority has long been fraught. The Turkic-speaking minority has struggled against Chinese rule for decades. In recent years, larger numbers of Han Chinese moving to Xinjiang have inflamed tensions, with alleged ethnic and religious discrimination rising. There were riots in 2009 that caused nearly 200 deaths. Uighurs have been accused of involvement in alleged terrorist, knife and bomb attacks that left dozens dead in 2014.

Beijing has repeatedly complained that a group called the East Turkestan Islamic Movement was leading a terror campaign against the Chinese state, arguing that ETIM has links to overseas terror networks such as al-Qaeda. In the aftermath of the attacks in Paris in November, Chinese state media accused the West of not recognizing that China was also under threat from extremism. "In their eyes, only terrorist

attacks that happen on Western soil can be called acts of terrorism," a China Daily [editorial](#) complained.

However, foreign journalists are often blocked from reporting about the alleged terrorist acts within China, meaning that it is difficult to corroborate or refute claims made in state media.

New America's analysis found that despite Beijing's concerns about the links between ETIM and international extremist groups, every single Chinese Islamic State fighter in the data said he had not fought in a "jihad" before. As the report notes, most appear to have arrived in Islamic State territory only after the group's capture of Mosul in June 2014, perhaps suggesting that they were waiting for a state to be established before they joined.

The report also suggested that Beijing's policies could be a factor, that the fighters may be looking for a sense of "belonging" after the Chinese government gradually framed the issue of Uighur national identity as a national security threat. [The Washington Post's Simon Denyer](#) reported in 2014 that China's war on terror was beginning to look like a war on Islam in general, with Muslims forced to eat during Ramadan fasting hours or work rather than attend Friday prayers. Last year, China banned some Islamic veils in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang.

Many academics acknowledge that Xinjiang has become more religiously conservative in recent decades, and some Uighurs were detained by the United States [at Guantanamo Bay](#) after the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. However, some also suggest that religion is being used as a means to establish a distinct Uighur identity in the face of ever-growing Chinese domination.

The New America report concludes that while Chinese Islamist fighters may be atypical, the broader conclusion for policymakers is that like many other foreign recruits, they are at least partially driven by local concerns. "Contextual knowledge is important," Rosenblatt says. "If the motivations for foreign fighters are derived from highly specific local conditions, so must the solutions."

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/>

## Attentat de Nice: premiers éléments d'analyse

15.07.2016

**L'Etat islamique essaie de renforcer la légitimité religieuse de ses actions terroristes et privilégie le vendredi, jour sacré pour les musulmans, selon un expert français.**



Un gros attentat était attendu en province, notamment dans une zone comportant une grande concentration de djihadistes. "Le choix de la province permet en effet de répandre l'insécurité au sein de l'ensemble de la population française en espérant que les forces de sécurité soient moins bien préparées à ce type d'action", a indiqué à Sputnik Thomas Flichy de La Neuville, membre de l'Université Paris IV-Sorbonne.


En analysant le moyen choisi par les terroristes, M. de La Neuville rappelle que l'Etat islamique utilise fréquemment les camions comme vecteurs d'attentat. Pour se protéger de ce moyen d'action, des pays comme la Tunisie ont mis en place des plots escamotables anti-camion-bélier. En Grande-Bretagne, des équipements anti-véhicules-béliers sont de plus en plus vendus.

L'analyste a également évoqué les résonances historiques de l'attentat, de 1789, 1790 et 1914. "Alors que l'on célèbre précisément le centenaire de la guerre de 1914, l'attentat de Nice nous ramène brusquement à l'ambiguïté du 14 juillet, qui est à la fois la fête pacifique de la Fédération des Français autour du Roi — le 14 juillet 1790 — et du déchaînement gratuit de la violence qui commence en juillet 1789.

<https://fr.sputniknews.com/>

## Attentat de Nice : qui est Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, le chauffeur du camion ?

15 juillet 2016



Le procureur de la République, François Molins, a confirmé l'identité du chauffeur de camion auteur de l'attaque terroriste qui a fait au moins 84 morts à Nice dans la soirée du 14 juillet, lors d'une conférence de presse vendredi à 17 heures. Il a également livré les derniers éléments d'enquête.

### **Attentat de Nice : l'Afrique exprime sa solidarité avec la France**

Il s'agit de Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, né le 3 janvier 1985 et de nationalité tunisienne, a indiqué le procureur, confirmant l'information donnée vendredi matin dans la presse. Marié et père de famille, il exerçait le métier de chauffeur-livreur à Nice, où il était domicilié.

**« Totalemment inconnu des services de renseignement »**

Neutralisé par des policiers, l'homme âgé de 31 ans a été retrouvé mort sur le siège passager. Il a été formellement identifié comme étant le propriétaire des papiers d'identité retrouvés à bord du camion frigorifique de 19 tonnes, loué le 11 juillet à Saint-Laurent-du-Var (Alpes-Maritimes). Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel « a tiré à plusieurs reprises sur trois policiers », avant d'être neutralisé au niveau du Palais de la Méditerranée, un luxueux hôtel sur la promenade des Anglais à l'issue d'une course meurtrière de deux kilomètres.

Il était armé d'un pistolet automatique 7,65 mm. Un deuxième pistolet automatique factice, deux répliques de M16 et de kalachnikov ainsi qu'une grenade, factices également, ont été retrouvés à bord du camion. Son téléphone portable « est en cours d'exploitation », a expliqué le procureur, insistant sur le fait que l'enquête n'en est qu'à « ses balbutiements ».

Selon François Molins, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel était « totalement inconnu des services de renseignement » et « n'avait jamais été l'objet de la moindre fiche S et de signalement pour des faits de radicalisation ». En revanche, il était connu des services de police, uniquement pour des faits de violence commis entre 2010 et 2016. Il avait été condamné le 25 mars 2016 à six mois d'emprisonnement avec sursis.

### **Son ex-épouse placée en garde à vue**

« Son ex-épouse est en garde à vue depuis 11 heures ce matin », a-t-il poursuivi, soulignant que de « très nombreuses données de téléphonie et de vidéo-surveillance » restent à analyser. « Deux adresses connues du mis en cause ont été perquisitionnées », a-t-il ajouté, sans préciser lesquelles.

L'homme a-t-il pu bénéficier de complicités ? C'est l'une des principales questions qui se posent, comme celle de ses liens éventuels avec les organisations terroristes islamistes. « Aucune revendication n'a été faite à ce stade mais je rappelle que ce type d'attentat correspond aux appels au meurtre d'organisations terroristes », a souligné François Molins.

### **Un homme « solitaire » et « silencieux », « peu pratiquant » et « marqué par sa séparation », selon ses voisins**

Selon l'AFP, le ressortissant tunisien est originaire de Masken dans la banlieue de Sousse. Interrogés par l'AFP, une dizaine de voisins de l'un des domiciles perquisitionnés tôt vendredi matin en présence des membres du Raid lourdement armés, dans un petit immeuble modeste d'un quartier populaire de l'est de Nice, l'ont décrit « solitaire » et « silencieux ».

C'était « un musulman peu pratiquant », « plutôt renfermé », décrit le quotidien régional [Nice Matin](#), s'appuyant sur d'autres témoignages dans son voisinage. « Il n'avait pas l'apparence d'une personne religieuse et était souvent en short, parfois muni de chaussures de sécurité », explique Sébastien, un habitant du quartier cité par le journal.

Selon le quotidien régional, l'homme, père de trois enfants, arrivé en France au début des années 2000, était « marqué par sa séparation en 2012 ». Interrogé par le journal, Mohammed, 37 ans, connaissait bien le suspect, qu'il décrit comme dépressif : « Il était en instance de divorce ou divorcé. Avec trois enfants. Un prêt venait de lui être refusé, et il devenait de plus en plus agressif ».

### **84 morts et 202 blessés**

La section antiterroriste du parquet de Paris s'est saisie de l'enquête à 1h du matin vendredi, pour « assassinats et tentatives d'assassinats en bande organisée en lien avec une entreprise terroriste » et « association de malfaiteurs terroriste criminelle ». Quatre magistrats ont été dépêchés sur place dans la nuit pour les besoins de l'enquête.

Quelque 30 000 personnes étaient venues assister au feu d'artifice organisé pour la fête nationale du 14 juillet sur la promenade des Anglais. D'après le parquet, l'attaque terroriste a fait au moins 84 morts, dont dix enfants et adolescents, quelque

202 blessés dont 52 en état d'urgence absolue, parmi lesquels 25 se trouvent en réanimation selon un dernier bilan.

<http://www.jeuneafrique.com/>



## Ce que l'on sait sur l'attentat de Nice

15/07/2016

**VIDÉO - Au moins 84 personnes, dont 10 enfants et adolescents, sont mortes jeudi soir sur la promenade des Anglais à Nice fauchées par un camion qui a foncé dans la foule sur une distance de 2 km.**

### • Un camion fonce sur la foule jeudi soir à Nice

Vers 23 heures jeudi soir, alors que le feu d'artifice du 14 Juillet touchait à sa fin, un camion blanc a foncé à pleine vitesse dans la foule, qui rassemblait des milliers de personnes dont de nombreux étrangers, et roulé sur près de deux kilomètres le long de la promenade des Anglais, célèbre avenue de Nice. «Il a changé de trajet au moins une fois. Il a clairement cherché à faire un maximum de victimes», a détaillé à l'AFP une source policière. Des corps jonchaient le sol, souvent recouverts d'un simple drap. Des personnes en larmes restaient parfois hébétées à leur côté sur une chaussée couverte de sang. Le Centre hospitalier universitaire de Nice a déclenché le Plan Blanc, avec la mise en place d'une ligne téléphonique pour les familles **04 93 72 22 22**. Le plan Orsec nombreuses victimes a lui aussi été activé.

### • Le bilan provisoire est de 84 morts et 52 blessés «en état d'urgence»

Le bilan de l'attaque est toujours de 84 morts, dont 10 enfants et adolescents. À ce lourd bilan provisoire s'ajoutent 52 personnes «en état d'urgence», 25 toujours en réanimation et un total de 202 blessés. Une cinquantaine d'enfants ont été hospitalisés à la fondation Lanval, hôpital pédiatrique de Nice, a indiqué la responsable de la communication de l'hôpital. «À 7h on a constaté deux décès d'enfants» au cours d'interventions chirurgicales, «d'autres sont encore entre la vie et la mort», a-t-il été précisé. Parmi les victimes, figurent notamment trois Tunisiens, deux Américains et une étudiante russe. Le numéro 2 de la Police aux Frontières locale fait aussi partie des victimes, selon les informations de notre journaliste Jean-Marc Leclerc.

### • Le conducteur a été abattu par la police

Des sources proches de l'enquête affirmaient vendredi matin que le conducteur du camion a tiré à plusieurs reprises avec un pistolet sur trois policiers avant d'être abattu par la police. Selon nos informations, il était seul à bord du véhicule. Les enquêteurs devront déterminer s'il y a eu des complicités en amont. La section antiterroriste du parquet de Paris s'est saisie de l'enquête. Dans la cabine, un pistolet 7.65 et un chargeur ont été découverts par les enquêteurs. À cela s'ajoute un deuxième pistolet automatique factice, une grenade percée et deux répliques de fusil d'assaut: une Kalacknikov et un M16. En outre, un téléphone portable et divers documents, qui étaient à l'intérieur de la cabine, sont en cours d'exploitation, a détaillé le procureur de la République. Parmi les éléments retrouvés, les enquêteurs ont mis la main sur une carte conducteur et une carte bancaire. Des papiers d'identité au nom de Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel, se trouvaient également à l'intérieur du camion. Sur les papiers d'identité, l'homme de nationalité tunisienne est âgé de 31 ans et domicilié à Nice.

# Attentat à Nice



Il était connu des services de polices pour de petits délits mais pas des renseignements. Selon notre journaliste Christophe Cornevin qui cite une source policière, il a été condamné dans une affaire de violence en mars dernier. Une perquisition a eu lieu au domicile du suspect. L'attaque n'a pour l'heure pas été revendiquée. Mais pour le procureur François Molins, «ce type d'attentat correspond aux appels au meurtre d'organisations terroristes».

Par ailleurs, des perquisitions ont été menées ce matin à Nice, notamment au domicile de l'assaillant. «Divers matériels informatiques et téléphoniques ont été saisis et sont également en cours d'analyse», ajoute le procureur.

#### • **Qui est l'auteur de l'attaque?**

Le chauffeur du camion qui a foncé dans la foule jeudi soir avait été condamné «une seule fois» à six mois de prison avec sursis à la suite d'une altercation lors d'un accident de la circulation, a indiqué le garde des Sceaux Jean-Jacques Urvoas dans un communiqué. Il a été reconnu coupable de violences volontaires avec arme le 24 mars par le tribunal correctionnel de Nice où il était domicilié, a précisé de son côté le procureur François Molins, pour des faits commis en janvier.

#### • **La piste terroriste est privilégiée**

Le président François Hollande a confirmé vendredi matin le caractère «terroriste» de l'attaque. «C'est toute la France qui est sous la menace du terrorisme islamiste» et «nous devons tout faire pour (...) lutter contre le fléau du terrorisme», a insisté le chef de l'État, qui a assuré que la France allait «renforcer» son «action en Irak et en Syrie». «Rien ne nous fera céder dans notre volonté de lutter contre le terrorisme et nous allons encore renforcer nos actions en Syrie comme en Irak. Nous continuerons à frapper ceux qui justement nous attaquent sur notre propre sol, dans leurs repaires. Je l'ai annoncé hier matin», a indiqué le président depuis l'Élysée.

Le choix du mode opératoire et de la date hautement symbolique évoque les consignes de groupes djihadistes comme al-Qaida ou l'État islamique. Dans un message audio diffusé en 2014, le porte-parole officiel de Daech, Abou Mohammed al-Adnani, encourageait ceux qu'il nomme «les soldats du califat» à utiliser n'importe quelle arme disponible. À l'image du djihadiste de Daech, Larossi Aballa, qui a assassiné avec un couteau le 13 juin un policier et sa femme à leur domicile dans la région parisienne. «Si vous ne pouvez pas faire sauter une bombe ou tirer une balle», leur disait-il, «débrouillez-vous (...) renversez-les avec votre voiture.»

» Une méthode qui rappelle des consignes de l'État islamique

#### • **L'état d'urgence prolongé, deuil national de trois jours**

Le projet de loi prolongeant l'état d'urgence pour trois mois sera présenté mardi en conseil des ministres «pour que le Parlement puisse l'examiner mercredi et jeudi», a annoncé vendredi Manuel Valls à la sortie d'un conseil de Défense à l'Élysée. François Hollande a également décrété un deuil national de trois jours de samedi à lundi, a-t-il ajouté, en précisant que les drapeaux seraient mis en berne sur les édifices publics dès ce vendredi.

Le président avait annoncé dans la nuit qu'il ferait «appel à la réserve opérationnelle, c'est-à-dire à tous ceux qui à un moment ont été sous les drapeaux ou dans les effectifs de la gendarmerie pour venir soulager les effectifs de policiers et de gendarmes. François Hollande est arrivée à Nice à la mi-journée, dans la foulée du premier ministre.

<http://www.lefigaro.fr/>

## India

### Africa outreach



*Prime Minister Narendra Modi's four-nation tour should be seen in political and economic contexts. India and Africa have much to gain from each other*

12 Jul 2016-08

There was the infamous “scramble for Africa” where many European countries made the last predatory thrust into the continent. It was a naked declaration of greed. It is interesting that at the turn of the 21st century, the two new economic powerhouses, China and India, are reaching out to many African countries, with the intention of extending economic aid. African countries do recognise the differences between the two outreach programmes.

There is goodwill and a sense of solidarity between the African people on the one hand, and India and China on the other.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Kenya needs to be considered in this broad context. There is no doubt that the Indian approach needs reorientation in many ways.

Modi has rightly emphasised the general principles about the challenges of global warming and terrorism. But these principles have to be grounded in realities. One of them is certainly the economic imperative. To a western world mired in market downturn for nearly a decade, India and African countries have much to gain from each other. And, of course, China too is to be included in this configuration.

While China is displaying its admirable efficiency in implementing projects in various countries, India has the advantage of how democracy and economic development can be combined to achieve progress.

There is, of course, the harsh African reality that there is extreme economic backwardness and political volatility in many countries. Therefore, India has to remain the torchbearer of political freedoms. The people of Africa, if not the leaders, look to India for its democratic traditions. India has a reputation to live up to.

Of course, the Indian Government has a difficult task of dealing with some of most unpopular African governments while helping the people of these countries. India cannot preach democracy nor withhold economic aid. It has to teach by example.

There is the realistic aspect. African countries present the potential of a big market and India can legitimately stake a claim. What it requires is a careful assessment of the situation and a sustained India-Africa developmental strategy. India has to look beyond the traditional south-east Asian, European and American markets. Africa is the future of the world economy.

Partnerships are not created just through State visits though they are very important in their own way. The Indian corporations and business people will be of greater importance in this regard. Efforts must be made to integrate the local people into the ventures. It is only through the right norms that sustained relationships can be built.

This would require a change in attitude on the part of Indians. They would need advisories to respect the local people and their traditions. It is better for Indians to be conscious of their racial bias, and work towards checking it at all levels. This is a responsibility that devolves upon the corporations and business leaders.

The other issue is that Indian strategists must for the moment withhold their grand dreams of turning India into a world power by turning Africa into India's sphere of influence. Realpolitik can wait. There are times when ethical approaches fetch better dividends than the strategic ones.

<http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/editorial-dnaedit-the-africa-outreach-2233579>

## Iraq

### Analysis: ISIS's Ramadan Campaign of Terror

Middle East expert Mohamad Bazzi explains how the so-called Islamic State's territorial losses in Syria and Iraq pushed it to focus on large-scale attacks around the world during the holy month of Ramadan.



A man sits amid a makeshift memorial inside a burned mall at the scene of a massive truck bombing last Sunday that killed nearly 300 people and was claimed by the Islamic State group, in the Karada neighborhood of Baghdad, Iraq, Sunday, July 10, 2016. *Hadi Mizban/AP*

**BEIRUT** – Throughout the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, militants and supporters of the so-called Islamic State group caused bloodshed and chaos, with bombings and mass shootings around the world. The spate of attacks began on June 12, when a gunman partly inspired by the group massacred 49 people at an LGBT nightclub in Orlando, Florida, and continued until the last days of Ramadan.

On June 27, suicide bombers killed dozens of civilians in Yemen and five people in a Christian village in Lebanon. The next day, militants stormed into Istanbul's main airport, killing 45 people, in the deadliest terrorist attack in Turkey's largest city this year.

On July 1, militants besieged a restaurant in the diplomatic quarter of Bangladesh's capital, Dhaka, setting off an hours-long standoff with security forces and killing at least 22 patrons, most of them foreigners. On July 3, a massive car bombing in Baghdad killed nearly 300 people – the deadliest single bomb attack in the Iraqi capital since the U.S. invasion in 2003. The next day, suicide bombers struck three cities in Saudi Arabia, including an attack near the Prophet Muhammad's Mosque in

the holy city of Medina.

All of these atrocities were loosely organized or carried out directly by ISIS, or inspired from afar by its leaders. In recent months, Iraqi government forces, with U.S. air support, forced ISIS out of the western Iraqi cities of Ramadi and then Fallujah. But as it loses territory in Syria and Iraq, under pressure from western bombing and local military forces, the group is trying to project its strength by organizing or inspiring attacks around the world.

In an audio message released on May 21, two weeks before the start of Ramadan, an ISIS spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, urged followers to carry out attacks in the West during the holy month in retaliation for U.S.-led airstrikes against the group's strongholds in Iraq and Syria. "Know that in the heart of the lands of the Crusaders there is no protection for that blood, and there is no presence of so-called civilians," Adnani said. He added that jihadists who heeded the group's call "will gain the great reward for martyrdom in Ramadan."

ISIS's reach and ability to sow terror expanded beyond the Middle East more than a year ago, when it inspired attacks in Paris, Brussels and elsewhere in the West. But after the bloodshed it instigated this past Ramadan, the group is entering a new phase. To make up for its battlefield losses, the group is lashing out with more attacks, especially on civilian targets. As the only militant group that has been able to create its own state, ISIS is transforming into a more sophisticated and deadlier version of its main jihadist rival, al-Qaida, which has never controlled a state. "As the pressure mounts on ISIL," CIA director John Brennan, using the U.S. government's preferred name for ISIS, told the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee last month, "we judge that it will intensify its global terror campaign to maintain its dominance of the global terrorism agenda."

Since 2013, ISIS and al-Qaida have been competing for funding, recruits and prestige. The two groups often disagree over tactics: to avoid a backlash similar to the one they faced during Iraq's civil war, al-Qaida's leaders have urged their followers to avoid targeting Muslims. But ISIS leaders endorse the wholesale slaughter of civilians, including many Muslims that they regard as infidels, as epitomized by the spate of attacks on Muslim countries in Ramadan.

Both al-Qaida and ISIS want to overthrow what they view as the corrupt and "apostate" regimes of the Middle East – the "near enemy." But the two groups differ on strategy. Al-Qaida's leaders are mainly focused on the "far enemy" – the United States and the West.

That focus was partly motivated by U.S. actions abroad. For decades, Washington has supported repressive regimes in countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which spawned al-Qaida's top leaders. Realizing that America was helping to prop up these regimes, the group targeted the "far enemy." In doing so, al-Qaida's leaders believed they would eventually force Washington to withdraw its support for the autocratic Arab regimes, and abandon the Middle East entirely.

But ISIS does not subscribe to al-Qaida's vision. Instead, it mainly focuses on the "near enemy" – the so-called apostate regimes in Syria, Iraq and other parts of the Arab world. By late 2014, the group seized large chunks of Syria and Iraq. ISIS then proclaimed a caliphate in the territory under its control, and named its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as caliph and "leader of Muslims everywhere."



With its self-declared caliphate, ISIS established a territorial base that has allowed it to govern, train thousands of fighters and generate income from illicit trade in oil and other resources – all on a scale larger than anything al-Qaida had achieved. ISIS has also established a larger recruitment effort and more sophisticated social media presence than al-Qaida's. ISIS operatives recruited and trained thousands of disaffected Muslims from the West, especially Western Europe. Some of these militants have been sent back to create clandestine networks and carry out attacks against civilians.

ISIS also gained control of more resources and generated far more income than any previous jihadist group, including al-Qaida. ISIS generates money by selling oil and wheat, imposing taxes on residents of the territory it controls, and through extortion. In 2014, the group raked in about \$2 billion, according to the U.S. Treasury Department. That included \$500 million in oil sales on the black market, and up to \$1 billion in cash stolen from banks while the group made its initial march on the border between Syria and Iraq. By contrast, al-Qaida has historically relied on donations from wealthy individuals, especially in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf Arab states.

But with new attacks, such as the assault on Istanbul's Ataturk airport and the string of bombings in Saudi Arabia, ISIS risks provoking a massive crackdown by the governments it has targeted. Already, U.S. officials say the group has lost nearly half of the territory it once controlled in Iraq, and a quarter of the territory in Syria. Its illicit oil revenues dropped to about \$150 million a year, from a high of \$500 million in 2014.

Over the past two years, ISIS displaced al-Qaida as the dominant force in international jihadism. Baghdadi's group has been more successful in its strategy, which relies on capturing and holding territory. But after its recent losses in Iraq and Syria, the group has reverted to its roots as a jihadist insurgency, bent on large-scale attacks that instill fear but achieve few tangible gains. In doing so, ISIS leaders are conceding that they might eventually lose their de facto capitals in Raqqa, Syria, and Mosul, Iraq. That means the group would squander the caliphate that has distinguished it from other jihadist movements and helped it attract new recruits.

ISIS has already suffered significant losses in its ranks: at its peak in 2014, U.S. officials say the group had about 33,000 fighters; today that number has fallen to between 18,000 and 22,000 militants in Iraq and Syria. But ISIS also has eight affiliates that have pledged allegiance to Baghdadi as caliph, and the largest of these groups – in Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nigeria – have another 20,000 militants fighting under Baghdadi's banner. By comparison, al-Qaida had only several thousand fighters at the height of its influence.

To combat this new and more complex range of threats posed by ISIS and its sympathizers, governments in the West and the Middle East will need to do more than simply continue military strikes against targets in Iraq and Syria. Deterring new attacks against civilian targets will require working toward political settlements in Syria and Iraq. It will also mean greater vigilance in monitoring clandestine networks set up by ISIS operatives – and adjusting to a new enemy that has proved it can adapt to new circumstances, and knows no limits.

*The views expressed in this article belong to its authors and do not necessarily re-*

*flect the editorial policy of Syria Deeply.*

<https://www.newsdeeply.com/>

## ISIS Is a Symptom, Not the Cause, of the Middle East's Disintegration

*And other vital lessons the US security establishment has not learned.*



Youth walk under an Islamic State flag in Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp, near the port-city of Sidon, in southern Lebanon on January 19, 2016.

We live in an age of disintegration. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Greater Middle East and Africa. Across the vast swath of territory between Pakistan and Nigeria, there are at least seven ongoing wars—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, and South Sudan. These conflicts are extraordinarily destructive. They are tearing apart the countries in which they are taking place in ways that make it doubtful they will ever recover. Cities like Aleppo in Syria, Ramadi in Iraq, Taiz in Yemen, and Benghazi in Libya have been partly or entirely reduced to ruins. There are also at least three other serious insurgencies: in southeast Turkey, where Kurdish guerrillas are fighting the Turkish army, in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula where a little-reported but ferocious guerrilla conflict is underway, and in northeast Nigeria and neighboring countries where Boko Haram continues to launch murderous attacks.

*This article originally appeared at [TomDispatch.com](http://TomDispatch.com). To stay on top of important articles like these, [sign up](#) to receive the latest updates from TomDispatch.com.*

All of these have a number of things in common: They are endless and seem never to produce definitive winners or losers. (Afghanistan has effectively been at war since 1979, Somalia since 1991.) They involve the destruction or dismemberment of unified nations, their *de facto* partition amid mass population movements and upheavals—well publicized in the case of Syria and Iraq, less so in places like South Sudan where more than 2.4 million people have been displaced in recent years.

Add in one more similarity, no less crucial for being obvious: In most of these countries, where Islam is the dominant religion, extreme Salafi-Jihadi movements, including the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS), Al Qaeda, and the Taliban are essentially the only available vehicles for protest and rebellion. By now, they have completely replaced the socialist and nationalist movements that predominated in the 20th century; these years have, that is, seen a remarkable reversion to religious, ethnic, and tribal identity, to movements that seek to establish their own exclusive territory by the persecution and expulsion of minorities.

In the process and under the pressure of outside military intervention, a vast region of the planet seems to be cracking open. Yet there is very little understanding of these processes in Washington. This was recently well illustrated by the protest of 51 State Department diplomats against President Obama's Syrian policy and their suggestion that air strikes be launched targeting Syrian regime forces in the belief that President Bashar al-Assad would then abide by a ceasefire. The diplomats' approach remains typically simpleminded in this most complex of conflicts, assuming as it does that the Syrian government's barrel-bombing of civilians and other grim acts are the "root cause of the instability that continues to grip Syria and the broader region."

It is as if the minds of these diplomats were still in the Cold War era, as if they were still fighting the Soviet Union and its allies. Against all the evidence of the last five years, there is an assumption that a barely extant moderate Syrian opposition would benefit from the fall of Assad, and a lack of understanding that the armed opposition in Syria is entirely dominated by the Islamic State and Al Qaeda clones.

Though the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is now widely admitted to have been a mistake (even by those who supported it at the time), no real lessons have been learned about why direct or indirect military interventions by the United States and its allies in the Middle East over the last quarter century have all only exacerbated violence and accelerated state failure.

### **A MASS EXTINCTION OF INDEPENDENT STATES**

The Islamic State, just celebrating its second anniversary, is the grotesque outcome of this era of chaos and conflict. That such a monstrous cult exists at all is a symptom of the deep dislocation societies throughout that region, ruled by corrupt and discredited elites, have suffered. Its rise—and that of various Taliban and Al Qaeda-style clones—is a measure of the weakness of its opponents.

The Iraqi army and security forces, for example, had 350,000 soldiers and 660,000 police on the books in June 2014 when a few thousand Islamic State fighters captured Mosul, the country's second largest city, which they still hold. Today the Iraqi army, security services, and about 20,000 Shia paramilitaries backed by the massive firepower of the United States and allied air forces have fought their way into the city of Fallujah, 40 miles west of Baghdad, against the resistance of ISIS fighters who may have numbered as few as 900. In Afghanistan, the resurgence of the Taliban, supposedly decisively defeated in 2001, came about less because of the popularity of that movement than the contempt with which Afghans came to regard their corrupt government in Kabul.

Everywhere nation states are enfeebled or collapsing, as authoritarian leaders battle for survival in the face of mounting external and internal pressures. This is hardly

the way the region was expected to develop. Countries that had escaped from colonial rule in the second half of the twentieth century were supposed to become more, not less, unified as time passed.

Between 1950 and 1975, nationalist leaders came to power in much of the previously colonized world. They promised to achieve national self-determination by creating powerful independent states through the concentration of whatever political, military, and economic resources were at hand. Instead, over the decades, many of these regimes transmuted into police states controlled by small numbers of staggeringly wealthy families and a coterie of businessmen dependent on their connections to such leaders as Hosni Mubarak in Egypt or Bashar al-Assad in Syria.

In recent years, such countries were also opened up to the economic whirlwind of neoliberalism, which destroyed any crude social contract that existed between rulers and ruled. Take Syria. There, rural towns and villages that had once supported the Baathist regime of the Assad family because it provided jobs and kept the prices of necessities low were, after 2000, abandoned to market forces skewed in favor of those in power. These places would become the backbone of the post-2011 uprising. At the same time, institutions like the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries that had done so much to enhance the wealth and power of regional oil producers in the 1970s have lost their capacity for united action.

The question for our moment: Why is a “mass extinction” of independent states taking place in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond? Western politicians and media often refer to such countries as “failed states.” The implication embedded in that term is that the process is a self-destructive one. But several of the states now labeled “failed” like Libya only became so after Western-backed opposition movements seized power with the support and military intervention of Washington and NATO, and proved too weak to impose their own central governments and so a monopoly of violence within the national territory.

In many ways, this process began with the intervention of a US-led coalition in Iraq in 2003 leading to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the shutting down of his Baathist Party, and the disbanding of his military. Whatever their faults, Saddam and Libya’s autocratic ruler Muammar Qaddafi were clearly demonized and blamed for all ethnic, sectarian, and regional differences in the countries they ruled, forces that were, in fact, set loose in grim ways upon their deaths.

A question remains, however: Why did the opposition to autocracy and to Western intervention take on an Islamic form and why were the Islamic movements that came to dominate the armed resistance in Iraq and Syria in particular so violent, regressive, and sectarian? Put another way, how could such groups find so many people willing to die for their causes, while their opponents found so few? When ISIS battle groups were sweeping through northern Iraq in the summer of 2014, soldiers who had thrown aside their uniforms and weapons and deserted that country’s northern cities would justify their flight by saying derisively: “Die for [then-Prime Minister Nouri] al-Maliki? Never!”

A common explanation for the rise of Islamic resistance movements is that the socialist, secularist, and nationalist opposition had been crushed by the old regimes’ security forces, while the Islamists were not. In countries like Libya and Syria, however, Islamists were savagely persecuted, too, and they still came to dominate the opposition. And yet, while these religious movements were strong enough to oppose

governments, they generally have not proven strong enough to replace them.

### **TOO WEAK TO WIN, BUT TOO STRONG TO LOSE**

Though there are clearly many reasons for the present disintegration of states and they differ somewhat from place to place, one thing is beyond question: The phenomenon itself is becoming the norm across vast reaches of the planet.

If you're looking for the causes of state failure in our time, the place to start is undoubtedly with the end of the Cold War a quarter-century ago. Once it was over, neither the United States nor the new Russia that emerged from the Soviet Union's implosion had a significant interest in continuing to prop up "failed states," as each had for so long, fearing that the rival superpower and its local proxies would otherwise take over. Previously, national leaders in places like the Greater Middle East had been able to maintain a degree of independence for their countries by balancing between Moscow and Washington. With the break-up of the Soviet Union, this was no longer feasible.

In addition, the triumph of neoliberal free-market economics in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse added a critical element to the mix. It would prove far more destabilizing than it looked at the time.

### **LIKE THIS? GET MORE OF OUR BEST REPORTING AND ANALYSIS**

Again, consider Syria. The expansion of the free market in a country where there was neither democratic accountability nor the rule of law meant one thing above all: Plutocrats linked to the nation's ruling family took anything that seemed potentially profitable. In the process, they grew staggeringly wealthy, while the denizens of Syria's impoverished villages, country towns, and city slums, who had once looked to the state for jobs and cheap food, suffered. It should have surprised no one that those places became the strongholds of the Syrian uprising after 2011. In the capital, Damascus, as the reign of neoliberalism spread, even the lesser members of the *mukhabarat*, or secret police, found themselves living on only \$200 to \$300 a month, while the state became a machine for thievery.

This sort of thievery and the auctioning off of the nation's patrimony spread across the region in these years. The new Egyptian ruler, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, merciless toward any sign of domestic dissent, was typical. In a country that once had been a standard bearer for nationalist regimes the world over, he didn't hesitate this April to try to hand over two islands in the Red Sea to Saudi Arabia on whose funding and aid his regime is dependent. (To the surprise of everyone, an Egyptian court recently overruled Sisi's decision.)

That gesture, deeply unpopular among increasingly impoverished Egyptians, was symbolic of a larger change in the balance of power in the Middle East: Once the most powerful states in the region—Egypt, Syria, and Iraq—had been secular nationalists and a genuine counterbalance to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf monarchies. As those secular autocracies weakened, however, the power and influence of the Sunni fundamentalist monarchies only increased. If 2011 saw rebellion and revolution spread across the Greater Middle East as the Arab Spring briefly blossomed, it also saw counterrevolution spread, funded by those oil-rich absolute Gulf monarchies, which were never going to tolerate democratic secular regime change in Syria or Libya.

Add in one more process at work making such states ever more fragile: the production and sale of natural resources—oil, gas, and minerals—and the kleptomania that goes with it. Such countries often suffer from what has become known as “the resources curse”: States increasingly dependent for revenues on the sale of their natural resources—enough to theoretically provide the whole population with a reasonably decent standard of living—turn instead into grotesquely corrupt dictatorships. In them, the yachts of local billionaires with crucial connections to the regime of the moment bob in harbors surrounded by slums running with raw sewage. In such nations, politics tends to focus on elites battling and maneuvering to steal state revenues and transfer them as rapidly as possible out of the country.

This has been the pattern of economic and political life in much of sub-Saharan Africa from Angola to Nigeria. In the Middle East and North Africa, however, a somewhat different system exists, one usually misunderstood by the outside world. There is similarly great inequality in Iraq or Saudi Arabia with similarly kleptocratic elites. They have, however, ruled over patronage states in which a significant part of the population is offered jobs in the public sector in return for political passivity or support for the kleptocrats.

In Iraq with a population of 33 million people, for instance, no less than 7 million of them are on the government payroll, thanks to salaries or pensions that cost the government \$4 billion a month. This crude way of distributing oil revenues to the people has often been denounced by Western commentators and economists as corruption. They, in turn, generally recommend cutting the number of these jobs, but this would mean that all, rather than just part, of the state’s resource revenues would be stolen by the elite. This, in fact, is increasingly the case in such lands as oil prices bottom out and even the Saudi royals begin to cut back on state support for the populace.

Neoliberalism was once believed to be the path to secular democracy and free-market economies. In practice, it has been anything but. Instead, in conjunction with the resource curse, as well as repeated military interventions by Washington and its allies, free-market economics has profoundly destabilized the Greater Middle East. Encouraged by Washington and Brussels, 21st-century neoliberalism has made unequal societies ever more unequal and helped transform already corrupt regimes into looting machines. This is also, of course, a formula for the success of the Islamic State or any other radical alternative to the status quo. Such movements are bound to find support in impoverished or neglected regions like eastern Syria or eastern Libya.

Note, however, that this process of destabilization is by no means confined to the Greater Middle East and North Africa. We are indeed in the age of destabilization, a phenomenon that is on the rise globally and at present spreading into the Balkans and Eastern Europe (with the European Union ever less able to influence events there). People no longer speak of European integration, but of how to prevent the complete break-up of the European Union in the wake of the British vote to leave.

The reasons why a narrow majority of Britons voted for Brexit have parallels with the Middle East: The free-market economic policies pursued by governments since Margaret Thatcher was prime minister have widened the gap between rich and poor and between wealthy cities and much of the rest of the country. Britain might be doing well, but millions of Britons did not share in the prosperity. The referendum about continued membership in the European Union, the option almost universally

advocated by the British establishment, became the catalyst for protest against the status quo. The anger of the Leave voters has much in common with that of Donald Trump supporters in the United States.

The United States remains a superpower, but is no longer as powerful as it once was. It, too, is feeling the strains of this global moment, in which it and its local allies are powerful enough to imagine they can get rid of regimes they do not like, but either they do not quite succeed, as in Syria, or succeed but cannot replace what they have destroyed, as in Libya. An Iraqi politician once said that the problem in his country was that parties and movements were “too weak to win, but too strong to lose.” This is increasingly the pattern for the whole region and is spreading elsewhere. It carries with it the possibility of an endless cycle of indecisive wars and an era of instability that has already begun.

<https://www.thenation.com/>



## Analyse de l'infographie diffusée par l'Etat islamique, à l'occasion des deux ans de la proclamation du « califat »

15.07.2016

image: [http://s2.lemde.fr/image/2016/07/15/534x0/4970169\\_6\\_11f2\\_2016-07-15-0257bc6-7270-1wvw0ca\\_a44ed5fbc42ef93023fe562e07bc4c32.jpg](http://s2.lemde.fr/image/2016/07/15/534x0/4970169_6_11f2_2016-07-15-0257bc6-7270-1wvw0ca_a44ed5fbc42ef93023fe562e07bc4c32.jpg)



Le « calife » Abou Bakr Al-Baghdadi, ici le 5 juillet 2014, peu après la proclamation du « califat ». - / AFP

Deux ans que le « califat » de l'organisation Etat islamique (EI) a été proclamé, le 29 juin 2014 ; deux ans que l'entité terroriste diffuse sa propagande. A l'occasion de ce deuxième anniversaire, l'organisation **Etat islamique a diffusé une infographie qui met en scène ses terrains d'action.**

Transmise par l'agence de propagande A'maq, qui relaie les actions de l'organisation à la fois dans les territoires qu'elle contrôle et à l'étranger, cette infographie diffusée en français en anglais et en russe célèbre la « *propagation de l'Etat islamique* ».

L'objectif de l'EI étant de **réunir** sous sa bannière et sous le guide de son leader **Abou Bakr Al-Baghdadi**, autoproclamé « calife Ibrahim », l'ensemble des croyants, l'infographie présente un grand nombre de territoires et d'Etats où vivent des communautés musulmanes.

image: [http://s1.lemde.fr/image/2016/07/15/534x0/4970168\\_6\\_2810\\_1-infographie-de-l-organisation-etat-islamique\\_2aabd9f47578d71468b4c0d09bdec334.jpg](http://s1.lemde.fr/image/2016/07/15/534x0/4970168_6_2810_1-infographie-de-l-organisation-etat-islamique_2aabd9f47578d71468b4c0d09bdec334.jpg)



L'infographie de l'organisation Etat islamique pour ses deux ans.

Malgré un usage copieux de la cartographie – on compte pas moins de dix-neuf silhouettes de pays, éparpillés sur trois continents de l'Europe à l'Asie, en passant bien évidemment par le Moyen-Orient, terrain d'action privilégié et berceau de l'organisation djihadiste –, l'infographie n'est pas construite selon une logique géographique, mais politique et stratégique.

Organisé en trois strates, ce document présente les « zones de contrôle majeur » de l'EI ([Syrie](#) et [Irak](#)), les « zones de contrôle moyen » (comme aux [Philippines](#), au [Nigeria](#) et en [Tchéchénie](#)) et les « zones de présence de cellules secrètes » (comme en [France](#), en [Turquie](#) et au [Bangladesh](#)).

### **Les zones de « contrôle majeur » : un artifice de propagande**

La Syrie et l'Irak sont présentés comme des territoires de « *contrôle majeur* » : outre à [constituer](#) les principaux théâtres d'opération de l'EI, ces deux pays regroupent les territoires conquis pas l'organisation, ce qui lui a ensuite permis de [proclamer](#) un califat. Ce point marque une rupture avec la stratégie déterritorialisée de sa « *sœur ennemie* » djihadiste [Al-Qaida](#).

Née d'une branche dissidente d'Al-Qaida en Irak, et ayant profité du chaos syrien pour [revenir](#) sur le devant de la scène et [gagner](#) en effectifs, l'EI a rendu inexistante la frontière issue des accords de Sykes-Picot, imaginant en 1916 le partage des territoires de l'Empire ottoman entre France et [Royaume-Uni](#). Par un artifice graphique, cette frontière contestée par l'organisation disparaît d'ailleurs de la carte principale, cachée sous un bloc de texte, alors qu'elle reste présente dans la carte en perspective cavalière en haut de l'image.

Autre élément qui révèle la finalité propagandiste de l'infographie, les deux pays sont montrés dans leur entier, alors que l'organisation marque un lent recul dans la plupart de ses terrains d'opérations, sous l'offensive menée par les forces gouvernementales (en Syrie et Irak), par les combattants kurdes (en Syrie et Irak) et par les milices chiites (Irak).

### **Les zones de « contrôle moyen » : un arrangement avec la géographie**

Dix pays ou régions sont représentés pour [être](#) des territoires sur lesquels l'organisation exerce un contrôle modéré. Dès lors, se pose la question du choix de ces pays, qui ne recourent ni des pays ou régions dans lesquels l'EI a proclamé des provinces (*wilayat*), ni des territoires où des groupes djihadistes ont prêté allégeance à l'EI.

Ce type de représentations ne correspond pas à la géographie habituellement diffusée sur l'organisation. Ainsi, trois *wilayat* ont été proclamés par l'EI en [Libye](#), qui figure ici en un seul morceau. De leur côté, la Tchétchénie et le Daghestan sont cartographiés en tant que pays autonomes, alors que ces deux Républiques de la Fédération de [Russie](#) sont d'habitude incluses dans l'émirat du Caucase, groupe djihadiste apparu en 2007, et dont une partie des membres ont prêté allégeance à l'EI en juin 2015.

D'autres approximations et exagérations sont à [relever](#). L'[Egypte](#) est montrée dans son entier, or la présence du groupe n'est à [signaler](#) que dans le Sinaï. Bien implantée dans le nord-est du Nigeria depuis que le groupe Boko Haram lui a prêté allégeance en mars 2015, la présence de l'EI est beaucoup plus contestable au [Niger](#) malgré l'attaque revendiquée au début de juin dans la ville frontière de Bosso, tandis que le [Cameroun](#), où plusieurs attentats ont été attribués à [Boko Haram](#), est ignoré.

A [noter](#) également, la surprenante absence de l'[Indonésie](#), victime de plusieurs attaques revendiquées par l'EI au début de l'année. Avec ses 250 millions d'habitants, l'archipel est le pays musulman le plus peuplé au [monde](#) (85 % des habitants) ; sa [population](#) est majoritairement jeune et très connectée, ce qui en fait un terreau potentiel de poids pour l'EI.

### **Les cellules secrètes : une stratégie de communication**

Sept pays enfin – l'[Arabie saoudite](#), la Turquie, l'[Algérie](#), la France, la [Tunisie](#), le [Liban](#) et le Bangladesh – sont mentionnés comme abritant des cellules secrètes de l'EI. Ils sont en fait les cibles principales de l'organisation. La France est le seul pays européen ouvertement visé ici. Mais pourquoi la France et pas la [Belgique](#), elle aussi victime récente de l'organisation ? Ce choix soutiendrait l'hypothèse selon laquelle les récents attentats de Bruxelles ont été précipités dans le [contexte](#) de l'[enquête](#) des attaques du 13 novembre, mais que la véritable cible reste la France.

Les autres pays présents au bas de cette infographie ont déjà été visés à plusieurs reprises par le groupe dans des attentats sanglants. Le [Bangladesh](#) l'a été au lendemain de sa diffusion, le vendredi 1<sup>er</sup> juillet, où vingt personnes sont mortes dans une attaque contre un restaurant de Dacca fréquenté par la communauté expatriée. Le pays était jusqu'alors connu pour être le terreau de son organisation terroriste rivale : Al-Qaida. Ce pays, où vivent 145 millions de musulmans, est un terrain propice : en proie à des tentations extrémistes, il est également une porte d'entrée vers l'[Inde](#).

On remarque aussi comment les pays ayant connu des attaques perpétrées par des individus se revendiquant de l'EI sans y [appartenir](#) formellement, comme les Etats-Unis, ne figurent pas dans l'infographie. On peut s'interroger sur l'évolution de la stratégie de communication de l'organisation qui, en novembre 2014, après [avoir](#) célébré la proclamation de 9 provinces disséminées en [Afrique](#) et au Moyen-Orient, appelait dans les colonnes de son magazine de propagande anglophone Dabiq des « *loups solitaires* » à [conduire](#) des attaques aux Etats-Unis, en Europe, au [Canada](#) et en [Australie](#).

Cette infographie soignée emprunte tous les canons d'une agence de presse : bandeau avec signature de l'agence A'maq en bas de l'image, couleurs vives, soin dans le choix graphique. Elle s'inscrit dans la stratégie de propagande de l'organisation, destinée à la fois à [rassurer](#) ses partisans et à [nourrir](#) la peur de ses adversaires en montrant une présence diffuse et cachée.

Le choix des couleurs n'est pas innocent : le rouge employé pour [désigner](#) les cellules secrètes participe à l'état d'urgence qui prévaut dans ces pays face à la menace terroriste. Les approximations parmi lesquelles la représentation de tous les pays à la même échelle (le Liban apparaissant comme presque aussi grand que le Bangladesh, alors que ce dernier est 13 fois plus grand) en font définitivement une infographie sensationnaliste.

<http://www.lemonde.fr/>

## Terrorist recruitment

The war on terrorism has not been successful because although the al-Qaeda has suffered irretrievable losses IS has simultaneously managed to metamorphose into a new rapidly growing terrorist threat



One of the more dreadful features of the Islamic State's regime is that it has managed to recruit suicide bombers to die for a country that doesn't even exist, and which, if it did would not even be their own. Until recently, suicide bombing was a tactic practised by civilians in revolt against an occupying army. But in Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh and Europe, the Islamic State has used this tactic aggressively. Nonetheless, the brutal nihilism of the jihadi movement continues to attract young men and women from Europe, the US, Middle East, Central Asia and the subcontinent. None of the simple explanations for this stands up to reality. Simply western foreign policy cannot be blamed since the Islamic State is fighting a sectarian war against almost entirely Muslim armies, and its most effective enemies, Iran and its allies, are also enemies of America and Europe.

Difficulty is finding the level of socially disparate groups that recruits to the global jihad, and this is unfortunately outside the scope and competence of the intelligence agencies. The growing threat of terrorism stems from the eagerness with which many young men and women from other parts of the world are being lured by religious fanatics. Nothing confirms this better than the increasing involvement of radicalised youths from Europe, United States Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries. It is this globalisation of terrorist networks that spells doom for many countries though the hand of foreign recruits is also evident in the barbaric acts carried out by the so-called Islamic State.

Recruitment tactics in the current global jihad is a phenomenon that has been studied by government, security services, academia and the media throughout the US and Europe up until the rage of recent terrorist attacks surprised the US, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh. The gravity of attention to this phenomenon will take further time, but the indispensability of such endeavours became quite clear with the attacks in Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia. Previously seen as a relative backwater in the war on terrorism, Middle East and Asia are now on the frontline. It is trench warfare, the harder you get at them the stronger they come back.

The recent geographical extension imposed by the Islamic State necessitates serious concern. Strictly speaking, it would be impossible to consider the Saudi Arabia dimension of the global jihad as an isolated phenomenon. Instead it is intertwined with individuals, organisations, ideologies and situations across the world. Jihad is truly global in nature, and it would amount to folly to ignore its close links to the Middle East, South East Asia, Central Asia and North Africa. The idea for the terrorist analysts is to examine the level of changing pattern of recruitment activity as it unfolds in Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia, and whether it has a direct impact on the US and Europe, or affects other countries.

While some may be surprised by the actual number of individuals being recruited for terrorist activity in Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh, this may not be the case. Since to present reliable figures on Saudi Arabia terrorists would require access to restricted government information across Saudi kingdom, needless to say, this would not possible to obtain, nor is it actually desirable. Several recent remarks by officials from European security services state that terrorist recruitment is on the rise.

Taking these remarks into consideration, and at the same time assuming that evidence exists to verify claims, focus remains on the general trends exemplified by specific cases. An obsession with numbers would likely result in a skewed and potentially misleading analysis. Central question that should be answered is what future trends are to be expected in the recruitment to jihad in Europe and Islamic countries. In short, will Europe and Islamic countries experience a decline or an increase in recruitment to “Islamist” terrorism in the near to mid-term future? One is inclined to argue that they are likely to see increased participation in the global jihad.

This development could lead to the assumption that threat from IS terrorism has not been annulled. While it is true that some terrorists have been put under considerable pressure, this perspective emphasises the organisational structure of a more or less defunct terrorist organisation, and does not take the wider social context into consideration. To simplify the argument, the war on terrorism has not been successful because although the al-Qaeda has suffered irretrievable losses IS has simultaneously managed to metamorphose into a new rapidly growing terrorist threat.

Something that unites a very diverse group of militant Islamists is their decision to make a link to jihad. Previously, the radical mosques facilitated these contacts and served as important recruitment localities. But by constantly applying pressure on militant circles they either became exposed or have slowed down their activities considerably. This approach however, did not eliminate the further recruitment of terrorists but it has pushed IS militants to consider other options. There are signs that recruitment pattern has changed due to the intensive surveillance of radical institutions, which has forced militants further into different thinking. Instead they have now formulated a different strategy to recruit, and the contin-

uing terrorist attacks signal a new development in which IS seems to be operating.

Another stage in the war on terrorism has reached where young Muslim men educated in prestigious colleges and universities and raised in affluent backgrounds are being recruited. More importantly, after selection they are reported missing, or they disappear from their homes for months and their parents seem to have no knowledge about their whereabouts or information about the radicalisation of their children except for them becoming more interested in religion. In spite of the police reports registered by their parents there has been no information about what they were doing during their disappearance. The behaviour profile emerging from the individuals involved in Pakistan, US, Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh terrorist attacks suggest that the first signs of such a development were invisible for the law enforcement agencies in their terrorism risk analyses. There is a strong case to argue that this may no longer be a simple case of missing children scenario, but the hidden act of terrorist recruitment in process.

Anti-terrorist operations and arrests of suspects are the visible element in contemporary counterterrorism. These are, needless to say, indispensable, but do not address the roots of the problem. Intelligence and security services should also, while fighting terrorism, concentrate on behavioural profiling that will allow them to better understand the ideological, cultural, educational, and social factors of this phenomenon in order to counter it efficiently. Averting the next attack obviously is a priority, but this can only be done when there is a thorough understanding of the changing tactics of IS recruitment strategies. The role of security services is vital but is only the tip of the iceberg.

<http://dailytimes.com.pk/>

## Syria

### Analysis: Islamic State Territory in Iraq, Syria Shrinks Another 12% in 2016

11 Jul 2016



The territory in Iraq and Syria controlled by Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) jihadists shrunk by another 12 percent during the first half of 2016, according to an [analysis](#) by IHS, a defense research firm.

“In 2015, the Islamic State’s caliphate shrunk by 12,800 km<sup>2</sup> to 78,000 km<sup>2</sup>, a net loss of 14 percent,” reports IHS. “In the first six months of 2016, that territory shrunk again by 12 percent. As of 4 July 2016, the Islamic State controls roughly 68,300 km<sup>2</sup> in Iraq and Syria, which is roughly the size of Ireland or the US state of West Virginia.”

According to the research firm, ISIS has lost about a quarter of the territory it once held in Iraq and Syria — an estimated 25 percent decrease from 90,800 km<sup>2</sup> to nearly 68,300 km<sup>2</sup>.

The IHS rate is lower than the Obama administration’s [recent estimate](#) of a nearly 33 percent loss of ISIS-controlled lands in [Iraq \(47 percent\)](#) and [Syria \(20 percent\)](#). IHS did not provide percentages by country.



“Over the past 18 months, the Islamic State has continued to lose territory at an increasing rate,” explained Columb Strack, senior analyst at IHS and lead analyst for the [IHS Conflict Monitor](#):

As the Islamic State’s caliphate shrinks and it becomes increasingly clear that its governance project is failing, the group is re-prioritizing insurgency. As a result, we unfortunately expect an increase in mass casualty attacks and sabotage of economic infrastructure, across Iraq and Syria, and further afield, including Europe.

IHS adds:

In April 2016, the [IHS Conflict Monitor](#) team outlined the decline in primary revenue sources for the Islamic State. In mid-2015, the Islamic State’s overall monthly revenue was around \$80 million. As of March 2016, the Islamic State’s monthly revenue dropped to \$56 million.

The \$56 million figure has likely decreased further since March, by at least another 35 percent, noted Ludovico Carlino, senior analyst at IHS.

“Combined with the military setbacks on the ground, this is having an impact on the internal cohesion of the group as indicated by a marked increase in defections and desertions since January 2016,” he added.

As ISIS reportedly shrinks in Iraq and Syria, losing [both territory and fighters](#), the group has expanded to eight countries and regions, including Libya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sinai, Nigeria, Algeria, the Caucuses, and Afghanistan-Pakistan, [according](#) to the Obama administration.

The terrorist group is also seeking to officially establish branches in the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Somalia where it already has a presence, Brett McGurk, Obama’s special envoy for the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS, told lawmakers at the end of June.

In the Philippines, the local jihadist group [Abu Sayyaf](#) has pledged allegiance to ISIS. Meanwhile, in Somalia, ISIS sympathizers are engaged in [turf battles](#) with the local al-Qaeda affiliate al Shabaab.

Many of ISIS’s global branches continue to grow.

Firas Abi-Ali, senior principal analyst at IHS, pointed out:

For groups like the Islamic State, the battle for hearts and minds is just as important, if not more important, than the military confrontation. As such, the expansion of terrorist attacks outside the core caliphate helps the group claim that it is still gaining support and expanding its influence, despite setbacks in Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State’s messaging has therefore adjusted to the caliphate’s loss of territory by pointing to its expansion outside Iraq and Syria, and to Allah’s assurance of final victory.

On Wednesday, the terrorist group [released a video](#) highlighting the “organization of the caliphate” in which it claimed to control of 35 “wilayat” (provinces), including 19 in Syria and Iraq.

“Over the coming year we are likely to see more towns and cities become isolated from the core caliphate, as was the case in Ramadi and Fallujah,” declared Strack of

IHS. “This could enable the fragmentation and gradual defeat of the Islamic State as a conventional force.”

ISIS is facing increasing pressure in northern Syria, home to the group’s de facto capital of Raqqa and a pivotal area for the jihadists that provides access to the Turkish border, notes IHS.

<http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/>

## Inside ISIS: Quietly preparing for the loss of the ‘caliphate’



This June 26 image — made from Associated Press video — shows Iraqi troops turning the Islamic State flag upside down in Fallujah, Iraq. (Uncredited/AP)

By [Joby Warrick](#) and [Souad Mekhennet](#) July 12

Even as it launches waves of terrorist attacks around the globe, the Islamic State is quietly preparing its followers for the eventual collapse of the caliphate it proclaimed with great fanfare two years ago.

In public messages and in recent actions in Syria, the group’s leaders are acknowledging the terrorist organization’s declining fortunes on the battlefield while bracing for the possibility that its remaining strongholds could fall.

At the same time, the group is vowing to press on with its recent campaign of violence, even if the terrorists themselves are driven underground. U.S. counterterrorism experts believe the mass--casualty attacks in Istanbul and [Baghdad](#) in the past month were largely a response to military reversals in Iraq and Syria.

*[\[Turkey and the Islamic State appear to be headed toward outright war\]](#)*

Such terrorist acts are likely to continue and even intensify, at least initially, analysts say, as the group evolves from a quasi-state with territorial holdings to a shadowy and diffuse network with branches and cells on at least three continents.

Iraqi forces are advancing towards Mosul, the largest city held by the militant group. (Reuters)

Indeed, while the loss of a physical sanctuary would constitute a major blow to the Islamic State — severely limiting, for example, its ability to raise money, train recruits or plan complex terrorist operations — the group’s highly decentralized nature ensures that it will remain dangerous for some time to come, according to current and former U.S. officials and terrorism experts.

“Where al-Qaeda was hierarchical and somewhat controlled, these guys are not. They have all the energy and unpredictability of a populist movement,” said Michael Hayden, the retired Air Force general who headed the CIA from 2006 to 2009.

*[ISIS’s allure increases as its territory shrinks]*

Islamic State officials, in public statements and in interviews, insist that the group’s “caliphate” project remains viable while also acknowledging that military setbacks have forced a change in strategy.

“While we see our core structure in Iraq and Syria under attack, we have been able to expand and have shifted some of our command, media and wealth structure to different countries,” a longtime Islamic State operative, speaking through an Internet-based audio service, said in an interview.

“We do have, every day, people reaching out and telling us they want to come to the caliphate,” said the operative, who agreed to speak to a Western journalist on the condition that his name and physical location not be revealed. “But we tell them to stay in their countries and rather wait to do something there.”

But signs of desperation are mounting weekly inside the caliphate, which shrank by another 12 percent in the first six months of 2016, according to a report last week by IHS Inc., an analysis and consulting firm.

A series of communiqués issued in the Islamic State’s Syrian enclave last month closed down Internet cafes in one province and ordered the destruction of TVs and satellite dishes in another.

The orders, billed as an effort to eliminate a tool for “disseminating infidel beliefs,” effectively cut off access to news from the outside world.

‘Without any city or land’

More signals of a coming downfall are contained in statements issued by Islamic State officials over the past six weeks, a period that saw the group’s fighters retreating across multiple fronts, from Fallujah in central Iraq to the Syrian-Turkish border.



Libyan forces allied with the U.N.-backed government fire artillery toward ISIS fighters' positions in Sirte, Libya, July 12, 2016. (Goran Tomasevic/Reuters)

A remarkable editorial last month in *al-Naba*, the Islamic State's weekly Arabic newsletter, offered a gloomy assessment of the caliphate's prospects, acknowledging the possibility that all its territorial holdings could ultimately be lost. Just two years ago, jihadist leaders heralded the start of a glorious new epoch in the world's history with the establishment of their Islamic "caliphate," which at the time encompassed most of eastern Syria and a vast swath of northern and western Iraq, a combined territory roughly the size of Great Britain.

The editorial, titled, "The Crusaders' Illusions in the Age of the Caliphate," sought to rally the group's followers by insisting that the Islamic State would continue to survive, even if all its cities fell to the advancing "crusaders" — the separate Western- and Russian-backed forces arrayed against them.

"The crusaders and their apostate clients are under the illusion that . . . they will be able to eliminate all of the Islamic State's provinces at once, such that it will be completely wiped out and no trace of it will be left," the article states. In reality, the group's foes "will not be able to eliminate it by destroying one of its cities or besieging another of them, or by killing a soldier, an emir or an imam," it says.

The editorial asserts that the "whole world- . . . has changed" with the creation of a theocratic enclave that has "shown all of mankind what the true Islamic state is like."

"If they want to achieve true victory — they will not, God willing — they will have to wait a long time: until an entire generation of Muslims that was witness to the establishment of the Islamic State and the return of the caliphate . . . is wiped out."

The same themes were repeated in an otherwise upbeat sermon by the Islamic State's official spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, marking the start of Ramadan observances. Adnani's missive attracted international attention because of its call for a global terrorism campaign during the Muslim holy month. But Adnani also appeared to be preparing his followers for heavy losses.

At one point he evoked one of the darkest chapters in the Islamic State's history, when the group — then known as the Islamic State of Iraq — was all but destroyed in 2008 by a combination of forces, including the U.S. troop surge and the “Anbar Awakening,” a revolt against the Islamists by Sunni Arab tribes.

“Were we defeated when we lost the cities in Iraq and were in the desert without any city or land? And would we be defeated and you be victorious if you were to take Mosul, Sirte or Raqqa, or even take all the cities?” asked Adnani, referring to the Islamic State's primary strongholds in Iraq, Libya and Syria. “Certainly not!”

Echoes of an inglorious past

The group's near-defeat in 2008 also has been cited multiple times in recent weeks in social-media accounts, suggesting to some analysts that its leaders are trying to limit the inevitable damage to the Islamic State's reputation among jihadists as an unstoppable military and moral force.

*[CIA director: ISIS not yet close to being restrained]*

“They don't want to lose territory,” said Cole Bunzel, a doctoral candidate at Princeton University's Near Eastern studies department who provided a translation and [commentary](#) on the al-Naba editorial in the blog Jihadica. “But they're trying to remind people that the group has a long history and they're going to persist, just as they did in earlier times.”

The deadly attacks against Istanbul's Ataturk Airport and Baghdad's Karrada shopping district — both relatively easy targets for terrorists concerned only with massive numbers of civilian casualties — were probably also part of the same effort to reassure followers of the Islamic State's vitality, said Will McCants, a Brookings Institution researcher and author of the 2015 book [“ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State.”](#)

“The successful attacks abroad are an indication of deep worry at home,” McCants said. After years of boasting of the group's invincibility, leaders such as Adnani are beginning to acknowledge battlefield losses while attempting to depict them in the most positive light, he said. Absent from the group's statements is any acknowledgment of strategic and tactical errors that contributed to the Islamic State's current predicament, fighting alone against a broad array of forces that includes the major Western powers, Sunni and Shiite Muslims, Russians and Kurds, McCants said.

“They're not trying to be clever about it,” he said, “but they're really trying to prepare their followers to cope with a ‘caliphate’ that is no longer a caliphate.”

The Islamic State operative who consented to an interview acknowledged that some of the group's followers had become disillusioned because of mistakes by individual commanders. He said he didn't care whether the organization's headquarters re-

mained in Raqqa or moved to North Africa or elsewhere — although he added that the loss of Raqqa would certainly be avenged.

“There is a message to all members of the coalition against us: We will not forget, and we will come into your countries and hit you,” he said, “one way or the other.”

European intelligence officials fear that the new phase is already underway. “They are . . . challenged as we adapt our strategy to their initial one, in order to start ‘de-sanctuarizing’ them,” said a senior French security official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss counterterrorism strategy. “But they will now expand to other tactics and start executing much more insidious and covert ops, in big cities.

“The next step,” he said, “has begun.”

*Mekhennet reported from Frankfurt, Germany. Liz Sly in Beirut contributed to this report.*

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/>

## Pakistan

### **Terrorism is terrorism and justification on part of Pakistan is not going to change that: Vikas Swarup**

14 Jul 2016

*Swarup has hit out at Pakistan over its comments regarding death of Burhan Wani.*

Hitting out at Pakistan over its strong comments on Kashmir situation in the wake of killing of militant Burhan Wani, India on Thursday accused it of not only infiltrating terrorists but also fanning discontent within the Valley by providing support to terrorist outfits.

Asserting that Wani issue was internal to India, External Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Vikas Swarup said Pakistan has no locus standi in the matter and asked it to refrain from interfering in it. Asked if there was a shift in Pakistan strategy vis-a-vis Kashmir where one sees increase in number of 'home-grown militants', he said, "It is part of the continued strategy of Pakistan of not only infiltrating terrorists from across the border but also fanning discontent within the Valley by providing various support to terrorist outfits." Terming Pakistan's continued effort to internationalise the Kashmir issue as "a self-serving exercise towards narrow political end", Swarup said the world has a clear view about which country in the region covets the territory of others, uses terrorism as state policy, provides sanctuary to UN-designated terrorists and terror groups and violates human rights.

"Terrorism is terrorism and no amount of justification on part of Pakistan is going to change that," he said. Referring to summoning of Indian envoy in Islamabad by Pakistan Foreign Office to raise Kashmir situation, Swarup said, the envoy conveyed to Pakistan that it was an internal matter of India. He also said India rejected the demarche issued in the matter to him.

Rejecting reports that Pakistan envoy here Abdul Basit will be summoned on the issue, Swarup said since it is an internal issue, India sees no reason to involve Pakistan which has no locus standi in the matter.

He also said that recent comments by Pakistan after the killing of Wani, Hizbul commander, reflect its continued attachment to terrorism and its usage as an instrument of State policy.

While Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has expressed "shock" over Wani's killing his Foreign Office termed it "extra-judicial".

On statements by Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) chief Hafiz Saeed that the ongoing protests in Kashmir would be intensified and warning that the deaths in the region would not be in vain, Swarup said it was incumbent upon Pakistan to reign-in such elements because if there has to be durable peace, such elements have to be controlled.

Asked if apart from Pakistan, any other Muslim country has raised Kashmir situation with India, he said there has been a statement by Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in this regard. "No locus standi and we don't need any gratis advice



from anyone," he retorted.

Yesterday, OIC issued a statement saying it "condemned, in the strongest terms, the killing of at least thirty civilians and injuring hundreds of others at the peaceful demonstrations being held to protest the killing on 8th July 2016 of Kashmiri leader Wani by the Indian security forces." It also called for a thorough and expedient investigation on the incident.

Asked about Chairman of the Pakistan People's Party Bilawal Bhutto calling up separatist leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq to express solidarity with the people of Kashmir, Swarup said there was no role for any third party in resolving issues between India and Pakistan. He was also asked whether Bhutto's call to the Mirwaiz was not unusual as Pakistani envoy usually talks to Hurriyat leaders.

<http://www.dnaindia.com/>

## Turkey

### Turkey coup: Erdoğan mourns casualties – and vows retribution

18 July 2016

Turkish president breaks down in tears at friend's funeral as number of people held in relation to coup rises above 6,000

Turkish president [Recep Tayyip Erdoğan](#) broke down in tears on Sunday evening as he paid his respects to supporters who died during a botched coup attempt this weekend – and ominously vowed to cleanse the Turkish state of dissidents after the arrest of at least 6,000 people, including 29 of the country's top generals.

Erdoğan sobbed uncontrollably during a funeral at a mosque in Istanbul as he tried to eulogise a father and son who were shot during the uprising. The father, Erol Olçak, one of 290 people killed during the failed putsch this weekend, was an old friend and longtime political ally.

“We march in our funeral shrouds, and we will deal with these assassins, this cult, these followers of Fethullah,” Erdoğan said, referring to the dissident movement run by exiled Islamic cleric Fethullah Gülen, who he accuses of orchestrating the coup.

Overcome with emotion, Erdoğan was unable to continue, but in an earlier speech at the mosque he promised to purge Turkish institutions of Gülen's supporters. Claiming that the “Gülen group” had ruined the armed forces, he vowed to “clean all state institutions of the virus”. Erdoğan also said [Turkey](#) would request the extradition of Gülen, who has been given sanctuary in the US state of Pennsylvania, and his backers. Gülen denies any involvement in the coup, and some analysts have also expressed doubt about his links to the events.

In emotional scenes outside the mosque on the Asian side of Istanbul, Erdoğan's fury was matched by that of thousands of flag-bearing supporters who gathered to pay their respects to the dead, and to condemn their killers.

“The coup was a form of terrorism,” said Mehmet Aydin, a 57-year-old former civil servant who had travelled all the way from Ankara to be at the funeral with his family. “Coup plotters don't care about the citizens – they just care about their own leaders, not the people.” Aydin was also a conscript and unwilling participant during a previous Turkish coup in 1980.

Police officers link arms during a funeral for victims of the failed coup attempt at Kocatepe Mosque in Ankara. Photograph: Ilyas Akengin/AFP/Getty Images

A few metres away, a journalist at a pro-Erdoğan newspaper had even harsher words. “These are the victims of soldiers who were mentally deficient,” said Ertuğrul Aydın, 42. “Their mentality was that of a terrorist or a madman.”

Erdoğan's government was partly saved on Saturday morning by huge numbers of Turkish civilians, who defied a military curfew to fill the streets in protest at the on-going coup, forcing the plotters to retreat.

Riding this wave of apparent popular backing, Erdoğan has begun a purge of the Turkish state, [detaining at least 6,000 people since Saturday](#), including 29 of Turkey's 300 generals. It follows a crackdown on civilians that was ongoing prior to the coup, and which may have played a part in its inception. Broadcaster CNN Turk said Erdoğan's chief military assistant, Ali Yazici, was among those being held.

Bekir Bozdağ, the Turkish justice minister, said in a television interview: "The cleansing [operation] is continuing. Some 6,000 detentions have taken place. The number could surpass 6,000."

There have been further isolated instances of violence despite the coup attempt having officially been declared over. At an Istanbul airport on Sunday evening, Turkish officials said shots were fired when 11 soldiers alleged to be involved in the coup tried to resist arrest.

US-Turkish relations have frayed over the accusation of Gülen's involvement, with the US State Department releasing a statement denying any link to the events. "Public insinuations or claims about any role by the United States in the failed coup attempt are utterly false and harmful to our bilateral relations," the State Department said, summarising a message given by the secretary of state, John Kerry, to his Turkish counterpart.

Kerry said that Turkey should produce evidence of Gülen's guilt, amid concerns that Erdoğan was using the aftermath of the coup to settle scores with enemies both at home and abroad. "We would invite the government of Turkey, as we always do, to present us with any legitimate evidence that withstands scrutiny," Kerry was quoted as saying at a press conference.

The Turkish commander of an airbase used by the US was among those detained on Sunday. An official said General Bekir Ercan Van, 10 other soldiers, and one police officer from the Incirlik base were being held.

Government supporters taking part in a sailing demonstration on the Bosphorous on Sunday. Photograph: Petros Giannakouris/AP

Bombing raids on Syrian outposts of Islamic State, which were suspended after it was claimed that a group of Turkish soldiers were involved in the botched coup, resumed on Sunday from the base. There was no suggestion that US troops at the base were in any way involved.

Both leaders of Islamist movements, Erdoğan and Gülen once had common cause in Turkey, partnering against secular opponents in the Turkish state. But in recent years Erdoğan has accused Gülen of remotely orchestrating a campaign to oust him. Gülen went into exile in 1999 to flee Erdoğan's predecessors, and Erdoğan himself turned on Gülen in 2014, when the US-based cleric was issued with an arrest warrant for allegedly running "a terrorist group".

Gülen denies that his supporters are behind this weekend's events in Turkey, and the plotters themselves said they were fighting to protect Turkey's secular traditions. Erdoğan has been criticised for eroding the secular mentality of the Turkish state, and undermining Turkish democracy.

This has not stopped him from using the coup to crack down on his opponents. In a

speech on Saturday, he said the coup was “a gift from God” because it would allow him now to “cleansing the army”. At least 2,380 officers and soldiers were arrested this weekend as the purge began, according to figures released on Sunday night. One of the captured generals was Erdal Öztürk, the commander of Turkey’s third army, who could now face the death penalty after Erdoğan’s allies called for a change to the constitution to allow the execution of plotters.

Erdoğan’s purge continued in other state institutions, with more than 2,700 judges fired from their posts. Most analysts agree that the failed coup has given him the public support he needs to push for a change to the political system. Erdoğan wants to centralise power around himself as president, rather than the parliament, continuing an autocratic trend that he has led in recent years.

France’s foreign minister warned Erdoğan against using the failed coup as a “blank cheque” to silence his opponents. “We want the rule of law to work properly in Turkey,” Jean-Marc Ayrault told France 3 television. Ayrault said the events of the past two days had also raised questions about Turkey’s reliability in the fight against Isis.

[Commenting on the situation in the Guardian](#), the Turkey analyst Andrew Finkel said: “Many would argue that Turkey was already in the throes of a slow-motion coup d’état, not by the military, but by Erdoğan himself. For the last three years, he has been moving, and methodically, to take over the nodes of power.”

Nevertheless, Turkey’s secular opposition was united in its opposition to the coup attempt. “Yes, we have problems in Turkey,” said Hişyar Özsoy, an MP for the pro-Kurdish HD party. “But at the same time, no military intervention can be a solution.”

<https://www.theguardian.com/>

## Is the surge in terrorist attacks coincidence or coordinated campaign?



Since the attack in Orlando on June 12, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has claimed or is suspected of responsibility for ensuing terrorist attacks in Jordan on June 21, Lebanon on June 27, Istanbul on June 28, Dhaka, Bangladesh, on July 1, Baghdad on July 3, and Saudi Arabia on July 4. Are these attacks part of a new global strategy by ISIS or, except for the ISIS label, a coincidence? Whatever the investigations ultimately reveal, the facts may be portrayed (or ignored) to fit narratives written even before the blood has dried.

Do the recent attacks represent a surge in terrorist violence? Not really. In the course of the ongoing conflict, similar spates of attacks have occurred from time to time. People tend to view them as evidence of escalation or a strategic shift, as something new and significant, when the cluster of activity is little more than a reflection of chance — several groups of attackers getting lucky at the same time and causing the world to take notice. A similar spike materialized in January with terrorist attacks in Libya, Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, Indonesia and Egypt.

Another part of the equation is that Islamist extremists, both al Qaeda and ISIS, annually call for attacks during the holy month of Ramadan, which this year ended on July 5. While mainstream Muslims regard bloodshed during the religious period as sacrilegious, jihadists are persuaded that what they misguidedly perceive as noble acts — like killing infidels — will earn them greater reward if carried out during Ramadan. Even greater violence was seen during last year's Ramadan.

On June 26, 2015, as [ISIS massacred over 200 civilians](#) in Kobani, Syria, jihadists elsewhere carried out a series of terrorist attacks: Al-Shabaab militants attacked an African Union military post in Somalia, terrorists gunned down tourists at a beach resort in Tunisia, bombed a Shiite mosque in Kuwait, carried out another suicide

bombing in Syria, and beheaded one person and injured several others in France. Altogether, more than 400 people were killed in these June 2015 attacks. This year, the reported combined death toll for jihadist terrorist attacks since Orlando, including at least 250 killed in Baghdad, is 385.

The 2015 attacks were unconnected with one another. It is not yet clear whether all of the attacks are linked this time around.

The **terrorist attacks in Paris** in November and **Brussels** the following March clearly were part of a terrorist campaign conducted by a network of French and Belgian fighters recruited and led by Abdelhamid Abaaoud, a Belgian foreign fighter who joined an ISIS unit in Syria in 2013. Other members of his network included ISIS veterans returning home assisted by an underground of local confederates. That network has been largely dismantled, but European authorities are discovering and dismantling the embryos of new networks.

The more recent attacks in Orlando, Istanbul, Baghdad, Jeddah and Medina in Saudi Arabia, and Dhaka might be explained in one of several ways.

**1. Except for inspiration, the attacks may be unrelated and only coincidentally carried out around the same time.** ISIS has been conducting terrorist attacks in Iraq, Turkey and Saudi Arabia for some time; these attacks may be viewed as part of the ongoing conflict in Syria and Iraq and reflect the group's general strategy. For example, ISIS terrorists have continued an intense terrorist campaign in Baghdad, carrying out more than 100 bombings and killing more than 500 people in the first six months of 2016. Bangladesh may be a separate phenomenon. The country has seen growing radicalization and increasing violence. Bangladeshi volunteers have been involved in various jihadist fronts around the world. Orlando is clearly a "standalone" attack with only a tenuous connection to ISIS.

**2. Alternatively, at least some of the attacks may reflect the dispersal of foreign fighters — ISIS volunteers now returning home determined to carry on the jihad — as well as new inspiration for homegrown violent extremists determined to go on their own warpath.** This phenomenon is going to be a big driver of future terrorist violence as ISIS, under external military pressure, frays from within and its foreign fighters disperse. ISIS encourages and facilitates such attacks, but the above list does not reflect a strategic decision by ISIS leadership to launch a global terrorist campaign. In other words, ISIS is the incubator, but not the central command, of a global terrorist campaign.

**3. Or possibly, ISIS's leadership has made a strategic decision to do whatever it can to stay in world headlines even as it loses ground in Syria and Iraq.** This also has a strategic logic. Jihadist strategy is based upon manipulating perceptions: maintaining its image of strength, momentum and success. This does not mean that every attack is centrally directed or that ISIS leadership is involved in its planning. ISIS seeks as much violence and chaos as possible, but appears to be opportunistic — it exhorts, facilitates, assists and, in some cases, may provide general direction. Much appears to depend on individual initiative.

White House and Pentagon announcements that U.S. airstrikes have killed specific ISIS commanders, giving their name and position, imply that American intelligence has a detailed wiring diagram of ISIS leadership. But do we have detailed information on its decision-making or do our assumptions rest upon what we observe?

What we see are some attacks that appear to support a logical strategy: destabilizing Turkey, stoking sectarian tensions in Baghdad, shaking up Saudi Arabia. Other attacks carry the banner of ISIS to bolster the credentials of their perpetrators, but reflect local contests and offer little evidence of direct ISIS involvement. Most of the homegrown terrorists, like the shooter in Orlando, simply declare themselves to be ISIS fighters, and while ISIS applauds their actions, it cannot be said to have carried them out.

A displaced terrorist group can still carry on a global campaign. Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the dispersal of al Qaeda in late 2001, a global campaign of terrorism unfolded with major al Qaeda terrorist attacks in India, Pakistan, Tunisia, Yemen, Indonesia, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Turkey, the Philippines, Spain, Egypt, the United Kingdom and Jordan. These were carried out by alumni of al Qaeda's training camps augmented by new recruits.

Between September 2001 and April 2006, 33 major terrorist attacks were linked to al Qaeda and an even greater number of terrorist plots had been uncovered and foiled. By 2006, the global terrorism campaign was on the decline as local governments — some of whom might have preferred to stay on the sidelines in the U.S.-led global war on terror — joined the international effort and ripped up local al Qaeda networks when faced with attacks on their own soil. The point is that even while al Qaeda's leaders were on the run, their followers were able to wage a worldwide terrorist campaign. We may see a time lag here, as well, with a global terrorist campaign inspired by ISIS lasting long after its demise as a territorial entity.

A number of the members of the terrorist network responsible for the Paris attack in November and the Brussels attack in March are in custody and should be able to tell authorities more about that network, which, in turn, may offer some clues about the role of ISIS in the current attacks. But will members of the network know whether its leader, Abaaoud, was an entrepreneur who persuaded ISIS leaders to support his initiative to launch a terrorist campaign in France and Belgium, or whether he was merely a lieutenant acting on behalf of higher-ups in ISIS? (One has to be cautious even about what those arrested say: Abaaoud was the local fighters' only contact in Syria and he may have presented himself more as the leader than as a subordinate taking orders from others.) And we still don't know to what degree Abaaoud was a unique figure and therefore whether ISIS retains this capability with him gone.

Turkey has identified the attackers at Istanbul's airport and has additional suspects in custody. The quality of this attack suggests that the attackers, like those in Paris, may have had ISIS support, but we are not sure. Are they another version of the Abaaoud network? Did the attackers all spend time in Syria? Where did their orders come from? Is there evidence of communications with ISIS while they were in Turkey?

Authorities in Bangladesh have identified the attackers in Dhaka and should be able to indicate whether they also spent time in Syria and if there is any evidence that they took orders from ISIS, or were homegrown terrorists inspired by ISIS. The same is true of those who carried out the attacks in Jeddah, Medina and Qatif in Saudi Arabia.

Political agendas invariably complicate analysis. Some government officials may wish to downplay the homegrown aspect of the threat and instead blame all terrorist

attacks on a central command center in Syria. The idea of a central command is tantalizing. During the Vietnam War, the United States spent years searching for the enemy's "Pentagon," a central command center believed to be located somewhere in western Vietnam or Cambodia. It was never found and it is not certain that any such physical headquarters ever existed. Adventure films end more satisfyingly with the hero escaping as the headquarters of some evil enterprise blows up in the background.

Other officials may wish to portray all of the attacks as an escalating terrorist campaign, which, in turn, calls for an escalation of allied military operations to quickly crush ISIS or requires increased security measures at home. According to this view, the attacks prove that current efforts are not working, or are not working fast enough. In contrast, still others will prefer to portray the attacks as the death throes of an increasingly desperate ISIS that is losing ground. In other words, the attacks are evidence that current military efforts are succeeding.

Or some may wish to portray the attacks as an escalating terrorist threat posed by Islamic radicalism in order to support broader biases against Islam or immigration, and the admission of Syrian refugees in particular. This interpretation makes no distinction between a strategic decision by ISIS and a troubled shooter in Orlando — all manifest the same threat.

Each interpretation will have different political and policy consequences. This is not to suggest that the intelligence services will bend information to support political positions, but rather that — given the reality of incomplete, inconclusive and sometimes contradictory information — political players will have ample opportunities to portray these events in a way that suits their agendas.

Few observers are likely to be satisfied by a messy, but possibly more realistic analysis, which suggests that the recent attacks reflect a combination of ongoing and not necessarily related campaigns in Syria, Iraq and adjacent countries; entrepreneurial terrorists using the space provided by ISIS as a launching pad for their own jihadist ambitions; scattering foreign fighters heading back home to carry on the fight; ISIS exhortations to local supporters to take up arms; and the appeal of ISIS ideology to angry and often troubled individuals pursuing their own trajectories.

*Jenkins is a senior adviser to the president of the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and director of the National Transportation Security Center at the Mineta Transportation Institute.*

<http://thehill.com/blogs/>



## Terrorists slip through profiling gaps

July 13, 2016 6:33 am



Left to right, top: Ulrike Meinhof, of Red Army Faction; shoebomber Richard Reid; Samy Amimour, one of the Paris gunmen. Bottom: 'Unabomber' Ted Kaczynski; Anders Breivik, Norwegian terrorist; and Omar Mateen, Pulse nightclub attacker

Since [Omar Mateen](#) massacred 49 people in an Orlando nightclub, the New York-born son of Afghans has been described as a homophobe who used a gay hook-up app, a jihadi who failed to understand that Isis and Hizbollah are enemies, and a jovial wife-beater who was both relaxed about his religion and furiously devout.

Mateen is not the first paradoxical jihadi. [Amedy Coulibaly](#), who murdered customers at a Jewish supermarket in Paris last year, died in the name of strict Islam but left behind a laptop full of child pornography. [Samy Amimour](#) was known as a personable bus driver with secular parents before he set off for Syria and returned to unleash mayhem on the Bataclan concert hall in the French capital in November. Among other recent terrorists are immigrants and natives, cradle Muslims and converts, hardened criminals and aspiring dentists.

Fifteen years after the September 11 attacks on the US there is still no consensus about what makes a terrorist. Mateen is widely considered a terrorist. Micah Johnson, who said he shot five police officers in Dallas last week because they were white, is not, on account of apparently having no agenda beyond his own actions. Both men resemble in some aspects the mass shooters who have struck American schools, churches and other public venues over the years and whose make-up and motivations are just as diverse as those of the "terrorists".

Recent studies have suggested that a history of depression or domestic violence might be key indicator, or that a society's attitude to the Islamic veil affects how likely it is to be struck. But psychiatrists, sociologists and others with knowledge of terrorism warn that such analysis often says less about the terrorist than the neuroses

of a country searching for an explanation.

That has meant gun control in the US, secularity in France and multiculturalism in the UK. More troublingly, they say, the misguided belief that terrorists — today’s jihadis, like nationalists, white supremacists and communists before them — have a single “profile” is distorting the west’s response.

“Mateen may have felt like a husband in some situations, a security guard in another, a gay guy in another, an Isis member in others,” says Marc Sageman, a psychiatrist and former CIA officer in Afghanistan. “People don’t have a single social identity that transcends everything else.”

Mr Sageman has worked as an expert witness on the defence team in terrorism cases. He has interviewed 30 violent terrorists and is dismissive of “armchair theorists” who do not enjoy such first-hand access. In 2008 he fought a [public feud](#) with other terrorism experts over his prediction that “leaderless jihad” would eclipse al-Qaeda’s organised plotting.

When attacks happen, Mr Sageman says, “two billion amateur Freuds” rush to extrapolate meaning from scraps of biographical detail. Seeking a pattern is futile, he says, beyond the fact that Islamic terrorists consider themselves members of an *ummah* — a community of Muslims.

“It’s an imagined community; it lives on the internet,” he says. “You can be a punk, you can drink, you can be homosexual — it’s your own identification.” Those who identify with that community perceive it to be under attack from western military campaigns in the Middle East and react to protect it, Mr Sageman says, just as Americans rushed to join the armed forces after 9/11.

A Facebook post Mateen wrote during his attack appears to bear this out. “You kill innocent women and children by doing us air strikes,” he wrote, according to Ron Johnson, chairman of the US Senate’s homeland security committee. “Now taste the Islamic State vengeance.”

## Podcast

### **Is Isis winning the cyber war against the west?**

How can western security agencies fight back against jihadi websites or predict those most likely to be influenced by them? Tom Burgis puts these questions to Kara Scannell, FT investigations correspondent, and Erika Solomon, Middle East correspondent

But Isis, as Islamic State is also known, does not appear to have had any contact with Mateen, beyond its [propaganda](#) exhorting sympathisers to carry out attacks on their own. And in both Europe and the US, terrorism experts say attempts to predict who is likely to answer that call risk backfiring.

“The problem is lots of people might fit a profile but not act, while those who do act don’t fit a pattern,” says Martha Crenshaw, professor at Stanford University. She was among the pioneers of terrorism studies in an era when the focus was on nationalists and extreme leftists at least as much as Islamists. As far back as 1981, she argued that the “limited data we have on individual terrorists . . . suggest that the outstanding characteristic is normality”.

In a [newspaper column](#) after Orlando, Ms Crenshaw upbraided Donald Trump, the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, for his claim that “thousands upon thousands of people” were coming to the US, “many of whom have the same thought process” as Mateen. When it comes to terrorist motivation, Ms Crenshaw wrote, “the possibilities are endless, from personal grievance to mental illness to social frustration”.


In contrast with the “lone wolves” in the US, the authors of the Paris and Brussels attacks belonged to organised jihadi networks with links to Isis’s so-called caliphate. Yet they also fail to conform to a pattern.

Farhad Khosrokhavar, a sociologist at the School for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences in Paris, has spent two decades analysing Islam in France. There, as elsewhere in the west, the political response to terrorism, including security measures brought in after November’s Paris attack, have been based on an erroneous faith in profiling, he says.

“[Political leaders] are playing this game,” he says. “They need to tell the citizens that there is a type of person we are going to fight against. But we can see at least five or six types of person who will kill.”

In the UK, Paul Rogers, a terrorism expert at Bradford university and author of a forthcoming book on Isis, argues that the search for a unique terrorist profile is “a diversion which means we are not paying attention to the wider trends”. Those trends, he says, include the increasing marginalisation of well-educated young men in places such as Tunisia and disruption caused by climate change. “It’s looking for easy answers without facing up to much bigger problems.”

### **The disparate faces of terrorism**



### **Ulrike Meinhof, Red Army Faction**

German leftwing militant whose Red Army Faction was responsible for a series of bombings, kidnappings and shootings in the 1970s.

Meinhof, who lost both parents at a young age to cancer, began to espouse an extreme leftwing cause in postwar West Germany. The mother of twins worked as a journalist before turning to terrorism.



### **Ted Kaczynski, ‘Unabomber’**

The anti-technology anarchist carried out a series of mail bombings in the US between 1978-1995, killing three people.


The Illinois-born son of Polish-Americans grew angry with industrialised society and moved to a remote cabin from where he carried out his attacks. Some blame treatment for a childhood allergic reaction and participation in university mind-control experiments for Kaczynski’s evolution into the “Unabomber”.



### **Richard Reid, shoe bomber**

The London-born son of an English mother and Jamaican father attempted to blow up transatlantic passenger flight with shoe bomb in 2001.

Reid grew up in a leafy London suburb before turning to petty crime. Converted to Islam in prison and travelled widely in the Middle East and Asia before attempting his failed attack weeks after 9/11.



### **Anders Breivik, rightwing fanatic**

The Norwegian killed 77 in a bomb and gun rampage in Oslo and on the island of Utoya in the summer of 2011.

Raised in an affluent part of the Norwegian capital, Breivik spent years preparing for the attacks, including writing a 1,500-page manifesto. Experts disagreed over his mental health but he was found at trial to be sane.



### **Samy Amimour, Paris gunman**

One of three gunmen, allied to Isis, who killed 89 at the Bataclan club in the French capital in 2015.

Born to parents of Algerian roots, the bus driver gradually turned to fundamentalism and spent time in Isis's "caliphate" in Syria before taking part in the atrocities in the French capital.



### **Omar Mateen, Florida attacker**

Claiming allegiance to Isis, Mateen killed 49 at the Pulse gay nightclub in Orlando in June.

Born in the US to Afghan parents, Mateen was apparently radicalised online, without direct contact with Isis. He had a hazy understanding of Islamism and was prone to violent outbursts.

## **Disclaimer of Liability and Endorsement**

While the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) strives to make the information on this publication as timely and accurate as possible, the ACSRT makes no claims, promises, or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of its contents, and expressly disclaims liability for errors and omissions in its contents. No warranty of any kind, implied, expressed, or statutory, including but not limited to the warranties of non-infringement of third party rights, title, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose or freedom from computer virus, is given with respect to the contents of this publication or its links to other Internet resources.

It should be noted that any opinions expressed are the responsibility of the authors and not of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), its publication board, its management or any funder or sponsor of the ACSRT, nor that of the African Union Commission (AUC),

Reference in this publication to any specific commercial product, process, or service, or the use of any trade, firm or corporation name is for the information and convenience of the public, and does not constitute endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the ACSRT and AUC.